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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF TIT AH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RIT.ON v m w) iw; , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of six counts of failing to make a tax return. 
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1101(1 )(b) (1995) and 59-
l-401(9)(b) (1996), and six counts of willful evasion of income tax, second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1995) and 59-l-401(9)(c) 
(1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did defendant knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel where he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and 
he received "hybrid" representation through his standby counsel's and active advocacy? 
Case No. 970601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
1 
Standard of Review: Whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived 
the right to counsel is a legal determination reviewed for correctness. State v. McDonald, 
922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah App. 1996); see also State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,918 (Utah 
1998). However, because this determination is highly fact-dependent involving variable 
fact patterns, the trial court is granted a reasonable measure of discretion in applying the 
law in these cases. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 781; see Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (trial court is 
in best position to determine whether defendant has made knowing and intelligent 
waiver). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following controlling constitutional provisions, statues, and rules 
are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1995); 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant by information with six counts of failing to make a 
tax return and six counts of willful evasion of income tax for the years 1990 through 1995 
(R. 09-11). A jury convicted defendant on all twelve counts (R. 900-23). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to serve zero-to-five years in prison on each of the convictions for 
failing to make a tax return and one-to- fifteen years on each of the convictions for willful 
? 
evasion of income tax (R. 961-72). The sentences were ordered to run concurrently (R. 
961-72; R. 1046:33).1 Defendant timely appealed his convictions (R. 990). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, a tax protestor, last filed a state income tax return in 1984 (R. 
1043:191). In the early 1990's, the Utah State Tax Commission sent defendant several 
letters asking him to file his state income tax returns (R. 1043:192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 
198, 199-200). When defendant failed to comply with the requests, the Tax Commission 
petitioned the third district court for a writ of mandate ordering defendant to file his 1990 
through 1993 state tax returns on a proper form (R. 1043: 202-03). 
Defendant failed to file any state income tax returns on the proper forms or to 
provide complete information to the Tax Commission, despite three separate orders by 
district court judges (R. 1045:530-31). These criminal charges followed (R. 09-12). 
Circuit court proceedings 
Defendant first appeared before Judge Hutchings (R. 1042). At that hearing, the 
court informed defendant, who was without counsel, of the charges and the degree of 
offenses for each charge (R. 1042). Defendant told the court that he did not have legal 
representation and that he was not sure whether he could afford to retain counsel (R. 
'The clerk did not number the individual pages of the transcripts. Therefore, cites 
to the transcripts will state the record number of the volume followed by the page number 
within that volume. 
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1042). Accordingly, Judge Hutchings appointed counsel to represent defendant and set 
the next hearing before Judge Nehring (R. 1042-43). 
Approximately two weeks later, defendant and his appointed counsel, Robin 
Ljungberg of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA"), appeared before Judge 
Nehring (R. 447, 448, 449). (A copy of the transcript of this hearing is attached as 
Addendum B). At the State's request, Judge Nehring asked defendant whether he 
wanted to be represented by counsel (R. 447-48). Defendant responded that he had met 
with Mr. Ljungberg that morning and learned that Mr. Ljungberg had only acted as 
counsel in one tax matter (R. 448). Defendant then stated, 
[I]t is my understanding that I am entitled to expert counsel. I require 
assistance of counsel because I am not an attorney. Fm not representing 
myself as an attorney. Vm a citizen in party. Therefore, Fm entitled to my 
rights. And under the Sixth Amendment, I am entitled to counsel. 
(R. 448-49; Add. B). 
After explaining that defendant's right to court-appointed counsel did not include 
the right to counsel with a particular expertise. Judge Nehring asked Mr. Ljungberg for 
his opinion (R. 449). Mr. Ljungberg believed defendant had "a handle" on the issues he 
wished to litigate; however, Mr. Ljungberg was uncomfortable for ethical reasons in 
advancing some of defendant's positions (R. 449-50). For that reason, Mr. Ljungberg 
offered to act as standby counsel with respect to criminal procedure so that defendant 
could raise and argue the defenses that he desired (R. 449). 
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Instead of accepting Mr. Ljungberg's offer to act as standby counsel, the court 
ordered "the appointment of Mr. [Lj]ungberg to continue in court with [defendant] to 
serve as standby counsel*' (R. 451; Add. B). The court added that it was willing to revisit 
the representation issue if later concerns arose (R. 451; Add. B). 
In view of Mr. Ljungberg's continued appointment, the State asked Judge Nehring 
for an order that all pleadings filed in the case come from Mr. Ljungberg's office and 
conform with appropriate procedural and evidentiary rules (R. 451).2 At defendant's 
request, the court denied the motion, stating that it would allow defendant to file pro se 
pleadings at this stage of the proceedings (R. 452). Judge Nehring warned the defendant, 
however, to file only appropriate pleadings that complied with the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (R. 452; Add. B). 
Subsequently, defendant filed numerous pro se motions, notices, and other 
pleadings (R. 34-99, 162-66, 178. 182, 185, 187, 190-95, 196, 198, 200, 203, 205-10, 
211,212,216,220,223,233-39). 
On the morning of the preliminary hearing, defendant moved for substitute counsel 
because he found it difficult to meet with Mr. Ljungberg and because Mr. Ljungberg had 
failed to obtain certain documents that defendant thought important for his defense (R. 
454-58). Defendant again raised Mr. Ljungberg's inexperience in tax matters and 
2This motion was apparently in response to a rambling pro se document entitled 
"Notice of Refusal for Fraud" already filed by defendant (R. 02-04). 
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complained that Mr. Ljungberg had advised him that it was unlikely that defendant would 
prevail in this case (R. 459). Judge Nehring again explained that although defendant was 
entitled to competent court-appointed counsel generally, he was not entitled to court-
appointed counsel with any particular expertise (R. 460). The court denied defendant's 
motion for new counsel on the ground that defendant's concerns did not allege 
incompetence by Mr. Ljungberg (R. 460). 
Prior to beginning the preliminary hearing, Mr. Ljungberg argued the merits of 
defendant's pro se request for a bill of particulars (R. 462-67). During the preliminary 
hearing, Mr. Ljungberg fully represented defendant, cross-examining the State's 
witnesses (R. 471, 489), raising objections (R. 472, 474, 475, 477, 480, 484, 486), and 
presenting closing argument (R. 507). 
After hearing the evidence. Judge Nehring bound defendant over for trial on all 
twelve counts (R. 518). 
District court proceedings 
On March 10, 1997, defendant, with Mr. Ljungberg, appeared before Judge Stirba 
(R. 1083:2-3). Mr. Ljungberg immediately represented to the court that he believed 
Judge Nehring had appointed him as standby counsel because "Mr. DeYoung had 
indicated a desire to represent himself'3 (R. 1083:3-4). (A copy of the partial transcript of 
3Mr. Ljungberg appears to be mistaken on this point, as the only order Judge 
Nehring made on the record regarding defendant's representation was to appoint Mr. 
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this hearing is attached as Addendum C). When the court asked defendant if he wanted 
Mr. Ljungberg to be his counsel, defendant replied that he had told Judge Nehring that 
Mr. Ljungberg was not familiar with tax law and that there were several issues that 
defendant wanted to present as a defense (R. 1083:4; Add. C). Defendant asserted that 
Judge Nehring had ruled that defendant would be able to represent himself "as a citizen in 
party and have Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel*' (R. 1083:5; Add. C).4 
After having defendant sworn, Judge Stirba engaged defendant in a lengthy 
colloquy (R. 1083:5-15; Add. C). She first advised defendant that he had the right to be 
represented by counsel (R. 1083:5; Add. C). After ascertaining that defendant could not 
afford counsel, Judge Stirba asked him if he needed to have counsel appointed for him (R. 
1083:Add. C). Defendant replied that he and Mr. Ljungberg had an understanding that 
Ljungberg was willing to help defendant with procedural matters, but that Ljungberg was 
unwilling to present certain issues that defendant wanted to (R. 1083:5-6: Add. C). 
The court then asked, "[A.]m I correct in understanding that you would not mind 
having counsel appointed to represent you so long as that counsel had expertise in tax law 
or was a tax lawyer, presumably with some criminal law expertise as well?" (R. 1083:7-9; 
Ljungberg to represent defendant, with the understanding that defendant could file pro se 
pleadings (R. 450-52). Moreover, given Mr. Ljungberg's full representation of defendant 
at the preliminary hearing, it is clear that prior to appearing before Judge Stirba. Mr. 
Ljungberg did not act in a standby capacity. 
4Again, defendant appears to be mistaken on Judge Nehring's actual ruling. See 
footnote 3. supra. 
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Add. C). Defendant responded, "That is correct" (R. 1083:9; Add. C). 
The court then advised defendant that he had the right to appear in his own 
defense, but that he also had the right to be represented by counsel (R. 1083:9; Add. C). 
The court explained, however, that defendant did not have the right to choose court-
appointed counsel, nor to have court-appointed counsel with any particular expertise (R. 
1083:9; Add. C). 
In response to further questioning by the court, defendant revealed that he was 
fifty-five years old, had completed three years of college, and was proficient in speaking 
and writing in English (R. 1083:10; Add. C). Defendant also stated that he had 
represented himself in prior administrative proceedings,5 and that he qualified himself as 
a legal researcher through years of studying law (R. 1083:10; Add. C). 
At this point, defendant expressed his lack of experience with courtroom procedure 
and stated, "[Tjhis is why I asked Mr. Ljungberg to assist me, so that I would be well 
within the procedure and the rule of the court" (R. 1083:10-11; Add. C). The court 
responded by asking defendant if he understood that, if he preferred, Mr. Ljungberg could 
be appointed to represent defendant and that defendant could then assist Mr. Ljungberg in 
representing him (R. 1083:11; Add. C). When defendant acknowledged that this was an 
5This may be referring to the prior writ of mandate hearings in district court as it 
was revealed at trial that defendant had represented himself at those hearing (R. 
1045:387-89). 
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option, the court asked if defendant had really thought about representing himself and 
whether this was the best way for him to proceed in light of his concerns and issues (R. 
1083:11; Add. C). Defendant reiterated that Mr. Ljungberg was uncomfortable in 
presenting the defense that defendant definitely felt should be raised (R. 1083:12; Add. C). 
Mr. Ljungberg agreed with defendant, interjecting that defendant wanted to raise 
some legal arguments that Ljungberg did not believe he could ethically present (R. 
1083:12; Add. C). Mr. Ljungberg added, ''And so I think that's why Mr. De Young and I 
came to this compromise" (R. 1083:12; Add. C). 
Responding to further queries by the court, defendant stated that he was reasonably 
capable of representing himself with the understanding that Mr. Ljungberg would be 
available to assist him in the preparation of pleadings and in presenting a defense (R. 
1083:13-14; Add. C). After advising defendant that if he represented himself, his 
pleadings would have to comply with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, state law, and 
federal constitutional law, Judge Stirba ruled that defendant could represent himself with 
the assistance of Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel: 
[Defendant] appears to me to be able to do so and understands the consequences of 
his doing so, that he's held to the same requirements as would be Counsel, if he 
were being represented by Mr. Ljungberg. and that is appropriate for Mr. 
Ljungberg to assist Mr. De Young insofar as he feels he ethically can do so. 
(R. 1083:14-15; Add. C). 
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Standby counsel *s participation 
Although defendant continued to file numerous, and sometimes repetitive, pretrial 
pleadings, Mr. Ljungberg actively participated in assisting defendant (R. 307, 309, 312, 
316, 322, 324). For example, Mr. Ljungberg filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on a Defense 
of Diminished Capacity and a subsequent motion requesting an extension of time for 
submitting defendant's mental health evaluations (R. 391, 522). At a hearing on 
defendant's pro se motions, Mr. Ljungberg asked for, and the court allowed him, a few 
moments to sum up after defendant had already made his arguments (R. 1083:30-31, 44-
45). Before trial, Mr. Ljungberg spent several hours advising defendant regarding his 
constitutional rights, the nature of the charges against him, the nature of the proceedings, 
the State's evidence, and how that evidence related to the elements of the charges and 
defendant's defense (R. 1083:110, 111, 112). 
At trial, Mr. Ljungberg continued to actively and zealously advocate for defendant. 
Mr. Ljungberg invoked the witness exclusionary rule on defendant's behalf and made 
objections during the State's opening statement (R. 1043:126, 133, 137). He also 
interposed several objections during the State's examination and to some of the exhibits 
that the State wished to have admitted (R. 1043:152-55, 189, 191, 208, 211; R. 1044:246, 
248, 252, 366, 376, 377, 379, 383, 396; R. 1045:518, 522, 524, 526). Although defendant 
also made several objections on his own (R. 1043:148, 151, 162, 178, 192, 194, 200, 203, 
205, 208, 211, 212), it was Mr. Ljungberg who argued the basis of many of those 
objections to the court (R. 1043:148, 155-59, 178-83, 180-81, 186, 204, 205, 212: R. 
10 
1045:337, 349-50, 358). At defendant's request, Mr. Ljungberg argued a motion to dismiss 
at the end of the State's evidence, as well as interposing objections during the State's cross-
examination of defendant (R. 1045:440-41, 478, 488, 518, 524). 
Mr. Ljungberg also assisted defendant in successfully arguing his objections to the 
some of the State's proposed jury instructions (R. 1044:278-79, 283-4, 288, 289; R. 1045; 
336, 344, 346-7, 349-51, 366). With Mr. Ljungberg's help, defendant was even able to 
obtain a jury instruction on his subjective good faith belief as a defense (R. 1045: 305; 483-
84; 533-34). Between the two of them, Mr. Ljungberg and defendant were able to keep out 
a significant portion of the State's evidence (R. 1043:181-4, 189; R. 1044:263; R. 
1045:377-80; 383).6 Defendant was also allowed to present his beliefs regarding taxation 
both by his own narrative testimony (R. 1045:456; 470; 472-4, 475, 477). 
Mr. Ljungberg continued his efforts on defendant's behalf at sentencing where he 
presented a lengthy argument asking for probation and recommending strongly against 
incarceration (R. 1083:8-16).7 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section. 
6For example, Ljungberg was able to convince the court to exclude defendant's 
wife's tax returns under the best evidence rule (R. 1043:181-4). Ljungberg also 
successfully argued that the findings, conclusions, orders, and transcripts of the district 
court mandate hearings involving defendant should not be admitted into evidence (R. 
1045:377-80,383). " 
7Defendant also spoke on his own behalf at sentencing (R. 1083:5-8). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the 
circuit court who ordered him to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. 
The record, however, reveals that in reality the circuit court gave defendant appointed 
counsel who represented him through the preliminary hearing. 
After being bound over, defendant asked the district court to allow him to represent 
himself with the assistance of standby counsel. After a lengthy and searching inquiry, the 
district court properly found that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore permitted defendant to proceed pro se with 
the assistance of court-appointed standby counsel. The court's colloquy was sufficient to 
apprise defendant of the disadvantages of waiving full representation and proceeding pro 
se. Any deficiencies in the colloquy were more than offset by standby counsel's zealous 
and active advocacy on defendant's behalf. Moreover, when viewed in conjunction with 
the record as a whole, the colloquy demonstrates that defendant was well aware of the 
advantages and benefits of having the representation of counsel. In sum. defendant's 
waiver of the right to counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. 
The record does not support defendant's contention that he expressly and 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel after he had validly waived it. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S COLLOQUY WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO WARN DEFENDANT OF THE DANGERS AND 
DISADVANTAGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION WHERE 
DEFENDANT WAS APPOINTED STANDBY COUNSEL WHO 
ACTIVELY AND ZEALOUSLY REPRESENTED 
DEFENDANT'S INTERESTS. DEFENDANT DID NOT 
INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER HAVING 
VALIDLY WAIVED IT. 
Defendant argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Defendant first asserts that the circuit court erred in ordering 
him to proceed pro se with Ljungberg as standby counsel because defendant never invoked 
his right of self-representation, but instead expressly requested that counsel be appointed to 
him. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. Aplt] at 7, 11. Defendant also claims that he never 
invoked his right to self-representation before the district court and that if he did. the 
district court's on-the-record colloquy was inadequate to warn him of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. Br. Aplt. 11. 13-19. Consequently, defendant argues, 
any waiver of the right to counsel was neither knowing nor intelligent. Br. Aplt. 19. 
Finally, defendant asserts that even if he did make a valid waiver of the right to counsel, he 
later expressly re-invoked that right before trial. Br. Aplt. 20-25. 
13 
A. Defendant was afforded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel throughout the circuit 
court proceedings. 
Defendant claims that he never expressly invoked his right to self-representation 
before the circuit court, but that he specifically asserted his right to be represented by 
counsel. Br. Aplt. 7-8, 13-14. Defendant asserts that Judge Nehring implicitly found that 
he wanted to represent himself and then ordered him to proceed pro se with Ljungberg 
acting as standby counsel. Br. Aplt. 9. Defendant argues that this deprived him of his right 
to counsel. 
Defendant is mistaken as to Judge Nehring's ruling. As stated in the fact statement 
above, defendant complained to Judge Nehring at his first hearing that Mr. Ljungberg had 
no tax experience (R. 448; Add. B). Defendant then demanded that Judge Nehring appoint 
"expert" counsel for him (R. 448-49; Add. B). The court refused, explaining that 
defendant's right to counsel did not include the right to counsel with any particular type of 
expertise (R. 449; Add. B). 
Mr. Ljungberg then stated that for ethical reasons he was uncomfortable in raising 
the defenses that defendant wanted him to, but that he would be willing to act as standby 
counsel to assist defendant in procedural matters (R. 449-50; Add. B). Judge Nehring, 
however, refused the offer, ordering "the appointment of Mr. [Ljjungberg to continue in 
court with Mr. DeYoung to serve as standby counsel" (R. 450-51; Add. B) (emphasis 
added). 
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Nothing in the record supports defendant's assertion on appeal that Judge Nehring 
appointed Mr. Ljungberg in only a standby capacity. To the contrary, the record indicates 
that everyone understood that Mr. Ljungberg was appointed to fully represent defendant. 
For example, immediately following the court's ruling, the State asked, "Your Honor, 
given the fact that Mr. [Ljjungberg will continue to act as counsel for Mr. DeYoung, may 
we expect that the pleadings filed in the case will come from Mr. [Ljjungberg's office?" (R. 
451 ;Add. B). Also, Mr. Ljungberg alone handled defendant's preliminary hearing, making 
objections, questioning the witnesses, and making argument (R. 471-2, 474-75, 477, 480, 
484, 486, 507). 
Because Judge Nehring appointed counsel to represent defendant, he committed no 
error and defendant was not deprived his right to counsel throughout the circuit court 
proceedings.8 
B. Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to full representation bv counsel 
before the district court. 
Defendant argues that he did not knowingly or intelligently waive his right to 
counsel before the district court, first because he never invoked his right to self-
defendant's confusion regarding Judge Nehring's ruling may have resulted in part 
from the judge's refusal to limit defendant's ability to file pleadings without going 
through Mr. Ljungberg (R. 450-41). Defendant's mistake on appeal may also stem from 
Mr. Ljungberg*s and defendant's later representations to Judge Stirba that Judge Nehring 
had appointed Mr. Ljungberg only as standby counsel (R. 1083:3-4). As noted in 
footnote 3, supra, that representation appears to be incorrect, as the State has been unable 
to find any order or indication in the record that Judge Nehring ever appointed Mr. 
Ljungberg as anything less than full counsel. 
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representation before that court, and, second, because the district court colloquy was 
insufficient as a matter of law to apprise him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. Br. Aplt. 11-13, 14-19. 
1. Waiver of the right to counsel generally. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the 
right to be represented by counsel. Faretta v. California, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527 (1975); State 
v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
App. 1996). The Sixth Amendment, the Utah Constitution, as well as state statute, also 
guarantee an accused the right to self-representation. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Faretta, 
95 S.Ct. at 2530, 2532-33; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1995); 
see also Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917; McDonald. 922 P.2d at 778-79; State v. Bakalov. 849 
P.2d 629, 632-33 (Utah App. 1993). 
A defendant who invokes the right to self-representation necessarily waives the right 
to counsel. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); McDonald. 922 P.2d at 779. 
However, because the defendant who represents himself or herself automatically 
relinquishes many important benefits associated with the right to counsel, the decision to 
forego those benefits must be knowing and intelligent. Faretta, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; 
McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. A defendant must be allowed to represent himself or herself, 
unless the court finds that the waiver is not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Frampton. 
737 P.2d at 187; Bakalov. 849 PF.2d at 634; McDonald. 922 P.2d at 779. 
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In this context, "intelligent" means "'only that the defendant has been provided with 
adequate information on which to make his or her self-representation choice. Because such 
a choice is seldom, if ever, a wise one, "intelligent" does not carry that meaning here.'" 
McDonald. 922 P.2d at 779 (quoting State v. Drobel. 815 P.2d 724, 732 n. 11 (Utah App. 
1991)). "Knowing" means that a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel and 
"voluntary" means that the defendant is "free from official coercion, even if not free from 
the influence of a mental disorder." Id. 
Defendant has not suggested on appeal that he was not competent to waive the right 
to counsel or that he was coerced into waiving counsel. He argues only that he never 
invoked his right to represent himself or, in the alternative, that his waiver was not 
"intelligent." 
A defendant intelligently waives his right to counsel if he was "made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he 
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."* Faretta, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann. 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 (1942)); see also 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918: McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779-80. That 
determination is best made by a colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant 
"because it insures that defendants understand the risks of self-representation." Frampton, 
737P.2dat 187. 
In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court recommended that when faced with a 
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prospective pro se defendant, trial courts should engage in a colloquy similar to that 
recommended to federal courts. Id, at 187-88 n.12. That recommended inquiry addresses: 
"whether defendant has studied law; defendant's experience at self-
representation; the charges and possible penalties faced; familiarity with, and 
the expectation of adherence to, procedural and evidentiary rules; a warning 
that the trial court will not direct or advise the defense; a recommendation 
against self-representation; and whether the choice of self-representation is 
voluntary. Finally, appointment of standby counsel should be considered." 
McDonald, 922 P.2d at 783 (quoting DrobeL 815 P.2d at 732 n.14): see also Frampton, 737 
P.2d at 187-88 n.12. In addition, a trial court should "advise the defendant of his 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to 
represent himself." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
The Court in Frampton, however, did not make the giving of the recommended 
colloquy mandatory. Instead, it held that in the absence of a colloquy, the Court would 
"look at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks 
of proceeding pro se." Id at 188; see also McDonald, 922 P.2d at 783-85 (colloquy that 
did not expressly follow all of Frampton's sufficiently demonstrated, in conjunction with 
other parts of the record, that defendant understood hazards of self-representation). 
Frampton held that the absence of an on-the-record colloquy did not require reversal so 
long as the record otherwise shows that "the defendant understood the seriousness of the 
charges and knew the possible maximum penalty" and "the defendant was aware of the 
existence of technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's 
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story." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188; see also McDonald, 922 P.2d 783-85; but see Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 918 (in absence of meaningful colloquy, court will look at record to determine 
validity of defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances). 
2. Defendant waived his right to counsel when he asked the court to allow him to 
proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. 
Defendant asserts that he never asked the district court to allow him to proceed pro 
se and that the district court never asked him whether he wanted to waive his right to 
counsel. Br. Aplt. 3, 13. In the absence of such an invocation or waiver, defendant asserts 
that the district court's colloquy was misplaced. Br. Aplt. 13. 
According to the following excerpts from the transcript, however, not only did Judge 
Stirba carefully inquire into defendant's wishes regarding representation, but defendant 
repeatedly made it clear that he wished to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby 
counsel because Ljungberg could not ethically present the defenses that defendant wanted 
to present: 
MR. LJUNGBERG: . . . I should clarify to the Court that I believe Judge 
Nehring has appointed me as standby counsel. Mr. DeYoung had indicated a 
desire to represent himself and that's something that we need to clarify today, 
obviously. 
THE COURT: All right. Certainly. Mr. De Young, is Mr. Ljungberg your 
counsel or do you wish him to be standby counsel for you? 
MR. De YOUNG: Your Honor, on our January roll call before Judge Nehring, 
it was determined in that hearing that, in meeting with Mr. Ljungberg that 
morning, Mr. Ljungberg was not a — familiar with tax law. And seeing that 
the charges by the State in this matter is pertaining to tax law, there are 
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several issues that I have as a defense that I would like to present to the 
Court. 
MR. DeYOUNG: And, at that point, you see, Judge Nehring did ride to the 
effect that I would be able to represent myself as a citizen in party and have 
Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel 
[Defendant is sworn.] 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung, I just want to make sure that you 
understand that you have a right to be represented by counsel in this criminal 
action against you. Do you understand that you have a right to be represented 
by an attorney? 
MR. De YOUNG: I do have an understanding that I have a right to be 
represented. I have asked the previous court for counsel that could represent 
me in regards to tax matters. 
THE COURT: All right. It evidently has been determined that you do not 
have the funds available to pay for your own attorney to represent you. Is 
that correct? 
MR. De YOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so you need to have counsel appointed for you; is that 
correct? 
MR. De YOUNG: To my understanding, Mr. — and with the understanding 
that I have with Mr. Ljungberg, he is willing to assist me in regards to the 
presence of the Court. Mr. Ljungberg expressed that morning in that meeting 
that there are certain issues that he would have problems in presenting 
before the Court. . . . And, therefore, he is — he admitted or agreed that he 
would assist. 
THE COURT: . . . However, I would advise you, Mr. DeYoung, that if you 
do have the means to retain counsel, you have the right to retain an attorney 
at your own expense. . . . Now, Mr. DeYoung, I understand your position is 
that you would not mind, or — well, that you would not mind having counsel 
appointed to represent you, but an attorney who is, in essence, a tax attorney 
or who has expertise in tax law; is that correct? 
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MR. DeYOUNG: I would « / would hope to be able to have representation 
to the quality that I would be able to bring forth the issues on the tax matters 
that I 'm entitled to. 
THE COURT: . . . . Is it - am I correct in understanding that you would not 
mind having counsel appointed to represent you so long as that counsel had 
expertise in tax law or was a tax lawyer, presumably with some criminal law 
expertise as well? Is that correct, Mr. De Young? 
MR. De YOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeYoung, not having before me the colloquy between 
you and Judge Nehring, I'm going to be asking you some questions about 
your ability to represent yourself. Now, you do have the right to appear in 
your defense, if you wish. You have the right to be represented by counsel 
also. So, if you wish to be represented by counsel rather than conduct your 
own defense, you certainly have the right to have that occur. You do not 
have the right to have a specific attorney appointed to represent you, or even 
one with specific tax background, and there are several reasons for that, one 
of which is that — are the framework of which we have LDA and other 
attorneys available to the court. This is how the appointment process works. 
I can't simply call on somebody else and appoint somebody else merely 
because you wish to have someone with — with some tax background. 
MR. De YOUNG: . . . . I have gone to classes, legal classes, and have been 
studying the law for a number of years. I have qualified myself as a legal 
researcher and. as a result, unfortunately, I do not have the presence of the 
court. And so this is all — this is new for me to know the procedure w ithin 
the courtroom. And so — and, of course, this is why I asked Mr. Ljungberg to 
assist me, so that I would be well within the procedure and the rule of the 
court. 
THE COURT: . . . . Do you understand you also have the option of assisting 
Mr. Ljungberg, if he were actually representing you and was not Just standby 
counsel? In other words — 
MR. De YOUNG: I --1 can understand that. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that you have that right? 
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MR. DeYOUNG: That is an option. 
THE COURT: All right. And, you've thought about this, have you? About 
whether that is — representing yourself is a better way for you to proceed, in 
light of your concerns and your issues? 
MR. De YOUNG: Well if I understand Mr. Ljungberg correctly, there are 
matters that he would be uncomfortable in presenting in my defense. And I 
feel that I definitely have a defense that should be raised before the Court. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: That is accurate, Judge. There are some legal 
arguments that I would feel uncomfortable, in an ethical setting, presenting 
as fact. And so I think that's why Mr. DeYoung and I came to this 
compromise. 
THE COURT: . . . . Is there any reason why you feel you'd be uncomfortable 
or unable to represent yourself in this matter with Mr. Ljungberg assisting 
you? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I would be very comfortable having Mr. Ljungberg 
assisting me, if that is a possibility. 
(R. 1083: 5-14; Add. C). 
As shown by the foregoing, it was defendant and his counsel Mr. Ljungberg who 
first raised the issue of self-representation (R. 1083: 3-4; Add. C). I was in response to 
defendant's and defense counsel's representations that the district court inquired into 
whether defendant wanted to have counsel appointed to represent him (R. 1083:3-4; Add. 
C). The district court carefully explained to defendant his options, including the fact that if 
Mr. Ljungberg were appointed to represent defendant, defendant could still assist his 
attorney in presenting a defense (R. 1083:5, 7-8, 11-12; Add. C). Given defendant's 
responses, it was reasonable for the district court to believe that defendant was invoking his 
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right to proceed pro se so long as Mr. Ljungberg would be appointed as standby counsel. 
Relying on United States v. Kienenberger. 13 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir. 1994), defendant 
nevertheless asserts that his repeated requests to be allowed to proceed pro se with the 
assistance of standby counsel did not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel as a matter 
of law. Br. Aplt. 11-12. Defendant's reliance on Kienenberger is misplaced. 
Unlike defendant, Kienenberger, did not claim that he had been denied the right to 
counsel. Kienenberger instead argued that he had been denied his right to represent 
himself, id, at 1356. Kienenberger repeatedly told the trial court he wanted to represent 
himself but that he wanted the "assistance" of counsel to help him with procedural matters. 
Id. at 1355-56. The trial court explained to Kienenberger that he had a constitutional right 
to either represent himself or to be represented by counsel, "but that he had no such right to 
'hybrid' counsel/' Id. at 1356. When Kienenberger continued to insist that he be allowed 
to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel, the trial court appointed counsel 
and Kienenberger was represented at trial. Id. at 1356. 
The Ninth Circuit held that defendant was not denied the right to self-representation 
because he had never invoked that right. Id. at 1356. Rather, Kienenberger had only 
requested to be able to proceed pro se with the assistance of "advisory" counsel. Id. at 
1356. Holding that there was no constitutional right to the "hybrid" representation 
requested by defendant, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Kienenberger's request. Jd. at 1356. 
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Here, defendant is correct that he also did not invoke his right of self-representation 
in the strictest sense. He is incorrect, however, that this means that he did not waive his 
right to counsel. Like Kienenberger, defendant repeatedly told Judge Stirba that he wanted 
to represent himself with Ljungberg as standby counsel. Although defendant was not 
constitutionally entitled to this "hybrid" representation, when Judge Stirba granted his 
request, defendant in effect waived his Sixth Amendment right to the full representation by 
counsel. See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 462 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(defendant's election to proceed pro se with court-appointed standby counsel was partial 
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
Defendant's assertion on appeal that he did not intend to waive the right to full 
representation of counsel is belied by his subsequent statements on the record. On the first 
day of trial the following colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: . . . Mr. DeYoung, let me ask you this: When you first came to 
this court, very first appearance, I was informed that you wished to represent 
yourself and that Mr. Ljungberg had already been appointed as standby 
counsel. Am I correct in that understanding? 
MR. DeYOUNG: Yes. That was ascertained in the preliminary. 
THE COURT: All right. So the Division II judge who handled the case, 
whoever that was, discussed with you about representing yourself and asked 
you if you felt you qualified to do that? 
MR. De YOUNG: Yes, he did. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. DeYOUNG: He did a colloquy very similar to yours. 
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 
Given defendant's repeated statements that he wanted to represent himself with the 
assistance of standby counsel and his subsequent affirmation, he should not be heard to 
complain that he received the relief he sought. 
In short, defendant's claim that his requests to represent himself with the assistance 
of counsel did not constitute a waiver of counsel is without merit. 
3. Defendant's waiver of his right to the full representation of counsel was knowing 
and intelligent. 
Defendant argues that if he waived the right to counsel, his waiver was not knowing 
or intelligent because the district court's colloquy did not fully advise him of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation as required by Frampton. Br. Aplt. 15-17. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the colloquy did not ascertain that defendant 
comprehended the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible 
punishments, additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case, or the risks and 
consequences of the decision to represent himself. Br. Aplt. 15-19. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the district court's colloquy substantially 
complied with Frampton's requirements and adequately informed defendant of the 
disadvantages of self-representation. Any deficiencies in the colloquy were offset by 
standby counsel's active performance. Finally, when viewed in light of the entire record, 
the colloquy demonstrates that defendant fully understood the benefits he would be 
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relinquishing when he waived his right to the full representation of counsel 
a. Adequacy of the colloquy itself. 
The focus of the colloquy is not on defendant's technical knowledge of the law, but 
on "whether defendant understands the traditional benefits of representation by counsel that 
he or she is giving up by choosing self-representation." McDonald, 922 P.2d at 783. The 
district court's colloquy in this case substantially shows that defendant understood the 
benefits that he would be relinquishing by proceeding pro se. First, although the district 
court explained that defendant was not entitled to "expert counsel," the court stated that 
defendant did have the right to court-appointed counsel and that defendant could assist 
court-appointed counsel in his defense (R. 1083:5, 7, 9, 10-11). See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 
918 (court must advise defendant of right to counsel). The court also explored defendant's 
background, determining that defendant was fifty-five years old, that he had completed 
three years of college, and that he was proficient in reading and writing the English 
language (R. 1083:9-10). See United States v. Bell. 901 F.2d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(defendant's extensive prior experience with legal system and his two years of college 
education were factors weighing in favor of finding intelligent waiver).9 Second. 
9Defendant correctly asserts that while defendant's background is relevant to his 
capacity to knowingly waive his right to counsel, it "is not dispositive as to whether he 
understood the relative advantages and disadvantages of self-representation." See 
Frampton. 737 P.2d at 188. The fact that background is not dispositive to an intelligent 
waiver, however, does not necessarily mean that it is wholly irrelevant to that inquiry. 
Clearly, a defendant's past experiences with the legal system, his education, and his 
maturity could shed some light on his awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se. See 
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attendant volunteered that he had attended some type of legal classes and studied the law 
for many years (R. r ^ " ^ .M C^ " e McDonald. 922 P.2d at 783 (colloquy should 
ascertain, whether defendant has studied la- .e ^ourt also ascertained that defendant 
li.iiii represents! huir "11 .il I '.i »l iv i ' in pii i ky.il |H i i.rdiiii" (R 10! '^ " 10 \<U\ "•' 'I See 
id. (defendant's experience at self-representation recommended part of Frampton inquiry); 
State v. Crisafl 608 A.2d 317, 325 (N.J \^{C) (defendant's prior experience in 
representing himself and in obtaining acquittal in prior rape case relevant to validity of 
waiver ot ngiu . . . . . . .. 
I ' M . * . ' l . i. •.. i . n l ' w M 
procedural rules and applicable federal and state law (R. 10^3.13-14; Add. C). See 
?; 1 : Donald, 922 P.2d at 783 (colloquy should inform defendant that he must compK 
technical rules> . L'nsafI 608 i \.2d at 324 (same). Defendant informed the court tl lat he 
:r-» nid •' • !, 1083 13 1 : I : • - 1 1 Z) 11,  1 .• \ igl: I tl n \ i list! i "il - , • • i I li 1 i I 
advise defendant against proceeding pro se? it is clear from the colloquy that defendant 
knew the value of counsel. Defendant acknowledged that courtroom procedure was new to 
him and explained that that was why he had asked u>i \\,, . jLiiigberg to be appointed to 
assi >cc MLOOIKUU. * .- , • . t-
representation not necessary for intelligent waiver of counsel particularly where defendant 
Bell 901 F.2dat579). 
understood dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se). Finally, both defendant and 
Mr. Ljungberg represented that they had been discussing defense strategy and theories, 
thereby indicating that defendant understood that presenting a defense involved more than 
"telling one's story." See Crisafi, 608 A.2d at 326 (in weighing whether defendant's 
waiver was intelligent, court considered that defendant devised his own defense strategy 
and that basis for rejecting court-appointed counsel was disagreement with counsel's trial 
strategy). 
The only inquiries suggested by Frampton that were not addressed in the district 
court's colloquy were an explanation of the nature of the charges, the possible penalties 
defendant faced if convicted, and a warning that the trial court would not advise defendant 
on how to proceed. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 783. While explaining the charges and 
possible penalties is important, its omission alone does not necessarily mean that defendant 
did not make an intelligent waiver. See United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 775 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (court's warnings adequate to establish knowing and intelligent waiver even 
though court did not question defendant about his understanding of the charges and 
possible penalties), petition for cert, filed, (Aug. 3, 1998). Furthermore, in this case, a 
warning that the trial court could not help defendant was unnecessary because defendant 
had standby counsel to advise him regarding procedure. 
Despite the foregoing omissions, the colloquy in this case reasonably indicates that 
defendant understood what he was giving up in terms of full representation as well as some 
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of the hazards of self-representation. Defendant's request for the appointment of standby 
counsel indicates that defendant was aware of the technical problems he might face in 
serving as his own attorney. See United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121, 1128 (7th Cir. 
1994) (defendant's recognition that he would be at disadvantage in representing himself 
and his obvious reliance on standby counsel weighs in favor of finding knowing and 
intelligent waiver). He also was aware that presenting his defense entailed more than just 
telling a story as shown by his agreement to comply with the rules of procedure. See 
McDonald, 922 P.2d at 785; United States v. Christian. 861 F.2d 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(court's warning that defendant would have to follow rules of criminal procedure despite 
his lack of familiarity with them demonstrates defendant knew hazards of conducting his 
own defense). 
Significantly, defendant's choice to represent himself appears to be based on the fact 
that Ljungberg was either unwilling or ethically unable to present the defense that 
defendant wanted (R. 1083:4-5, 11-12; Add. C). Defendant made a conscious decision that 
he would rather have the opportunity to present his defense, while still being able to enjoy 
the technical advice of counsel (R. 1083:11-12; Add. C). This supports the trial court's 
finding that defendant's decision to proceed pro se with the assistance of counsel was a 
knowing and intelligent one. See Bell, 901 F.2d at 579 (defendant's tactical decision to 
proceed pro se because his attorney was unwilling to present alibi defense supports finding 
of knowing and intelligent waiver). 
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b. Standby counsel's zealous and active representation of defendant offsets 
any defects in the colloquy in this case. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court's colloquy was inadequate to show 
that defendant understood the hazards of self-representation, any deficiencies were more 
than offset by standby counsel's active and zealous assistance. This, and several other 
courts, have recognized that the presence of standby counsel who actively participates in 
assisting and advising defendant is "a significant safeguard that offsets some of [a] 
colloquy's deficiencies." McDonald, 922 P.2d at 785; see also People v. Hite, 450 N.E.2d 
416, 418 (111. App. 1983) (full admonishments not required and record need not reflect 
unequivocal waiver of counsel where defendant proceeds to trial with the active "technical 
assistance" of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 462 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983) (full waiver colloquy need not be met where defendant receives "hybrid" 
representation, i.e., self-representation with the assistance of standby counsel); Phillips v. 
State, 604 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1979) (no error for trial court to fail to 
admonish defendant as to dangers, if any, of "hybrid" representation); State v. Barker, 667 
P.2d 108, 113 (Wash Ct. App. 1983) (trial court was not required to advise defendant of 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before appointing him as co-counsel to 
court-appointed counsel); State v. Lavton. 432 S.E.2d 740, 749 (W.Va. 1993) (full 
admonitions of waiver colloquy not required where standby counsel actively participates in 
presenting defense). Cf Patterson, 140 F.3d at 775 (appointment and active assistance of 
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standby counsel sufficiently shows defendant's awareness of his right to counsel); Bell, 901 
F.2d at 578 (active standby counsel weighs in favor of finding a knowing waiver);; Strozier 
v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 1989) (appointment of standby counsel and 
extent to which he or she aided defendant is important factor in determining whether 
waiver is knowing and intelligent); Crisafi, 608 A.2d at 326 (availability and active 
participation of standby counsel a significant factor in determining that defendant's waiver 
was knowing and intelligent). 
The reasoning underlying these decisions is two-fold. First, the defendant who 
receives the active assistance of standby counsel does not truly give up all the advantages 
and benefits of the representation of counsel, thereby making a full colloquy unnecessary. 
See, e.g., Phillips, 604 S.W.2d at 908 (defendant has not completely waived right to 
counsel when "hybrid" representation provided). Second is the recognition that 
a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense with the advice of counsel 
partakes of the freedom of defending himself in addition to the expertise of an 
advisor with legal training. A defendant who wishes to act pro se desires to 
stand alone, but this does not occur if a lawyer assists him at trial. In this 
instance, a defendant receiving such legal advice should not be heard to 
complain on appeal of improprieties pertaining to admonishments about 
proceeding pro se or of deficiencies apparent of record relating to a waiver of 
legal assistance. 
Hite, 450 N.E.2d at 418. See also Layton, 432 S.E.2d at 747 (recognizing substantial 
difference between colloquy which must be followed when a defendant elects to proceed 
wholly pro se as opposed to when he proceeds pro se with the assistance of counsel). 
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As noted above, Mr. Ljungberg went well beyond the minimal role usually assumed 
by standby counsel. He met with defendant several times and advised him not only of his 
constitutional rights, but also of the nature of the charges and proceedings against him (R. 
1083:110, 11, 112). Mr. Ljungberg assisted defendant in arguing his pro se motions, 
objectings to proposed instructions, and arguing in support of proposed jury instructions 
(R.1083: 30-31, 44-45; R. 1044:278-79, 283-84, 288, 289; R. 1045:336, 344, 346-7, 349-
51. 366). Although defendant cross-examined all the witnesses at trial, the court told 
defendant that he could have Mr. Ljungberg conduct cross-examination if that made him 
feel more comfortable (R. 1043:161). Further, although defendant raised several 
objections, Mr. Ljungberg raised at least as many, in addition to arguing the legal and 
evidentiary basis for defendant's objections (R. 1043:148, 152-9, 180-1, 189, 191,204, 
205, 208, 211, 212; R. 1044:246, 248, 252, 366, 376, 377, 379, 383, 396; R. 1045:337, 349-
50, 518, 522, 524, 526). Moreover, whenever defendant floundered, Ljungberg stepped in 
to assist him (R. 1043:148, 180-1). 
In sum, although defendant did not receive full representation, this was not a 
situation in which defendant was forced to muddle his way through. Rather, defendant 
received "hybrid" representation in which he was permitted to present his defenses and 
issues while enjoying many of the advantages of full legal representation. Given the 
minimal risk that defendant was exposed to by this arrangement, the district court's 
colloquy was more than sufficient to advise defendant of his rights and of the disadvantages 
of proceeding pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. 
c. Adequacy of the colloquy in light of the record. 
A review of the whole record in conjunction with the colloquy also demonstrates 
that defendant was sufficiently aware of the disadvantages of proceeding without full legal 
representation. See McDonald, 922 P.2d at 783-84 (court viewed totality of circumstances 
of case as reflected in record, with particular emphasis on court's colloquy). 
Defendant argues that if a colloquy is defective, an appellate court "may look to the 
record to determine the validity of the waiver only in "extraordinary circumstances." Br. 
Aplt. 16. Defendant relies on the recent decision of State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 
(Utah 1998), to support this argument. Defendant misapprehends the import of the holding 
in Heaton. 
In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the trial court was in the best 
position for determining whether a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived the right to counsel because the trial court had the benefit of questioning the 
defendant and observing his demeanor. Id at 918. Observing that an appellate court's 
proper role was "to review the trial court's findings and conclusions and then determine 
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the defendant validly waived counsel," the 
Court explained that a meaningful review could take place only after the trial court had 
conducted a meaningful inquiry of the defendant. IdL 
The Court acknowledged that it had previously expressed a willingness to search the 
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record for evidence that would support a valid waiver, but now held that "in the absence of 
such a colloquy/' the Court would "look at the record and make a de novo determination 
regarding the validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the 
existence of which [would be] address[ed] on a case-by-case basis." Ld. at 918. Thus, by 
its express terms, Heaton's restriction on reviewing the whole record applies only when no 
colloquy or warnings are given. 
In this case, the trial court not only conducted a colloquy, but it engaged in a lengthy 
and searching one that explored the defendant's desires regarding the representation of 
counsel, his background and experience with the legal system, a thorough explanation of 
his options, and the basis for his request for "hybrid" representation. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to look at the record to see if the trial court correctly determined the validity of 
defendant's waiver of the right to full representation. 
Such a review demonstrates that despite any deficiencies in the colloquy, defendant 
was nevertheless well aware of the nature of the charges against him and the seriousness of 
the potential penalties he faced. The charges and the degree of offenses were read to 
defendant at his first appearance (R. 1042). Knowing that he was charged with twelve 
felony counts placed defendant on clear notice that he could incur serious penalties in the 
event he was convicted. Defendant also sat through a preliminary hearing in which he 
heard the State's evidence and the State's theory of its case. Although Mr. Ljungberg 
argued at the beginning of the preliminary hearing that defendant was entitled to a bill of 
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particulars on the information (R. 462-67), at the end of hearing, Judge Nehring observed 
that he did not know how defendant could not know what the State's claims were after 
hearing the evidence presented (R. 519). 
Mr. Ljungberg also met with defendant several times and discussed with him the 
nature of the charges, his constitutional rights, the State's evidence and possible defenses 
(R. 1083:110, 111, 112). Judge Stirba also explained the process for jury voir and 
exercising juror challenges (R. 1083:144-49). Defendant prepared and filed numerous 
pleadings over a period of several months, including discovery and pretrial motions (R. 34, 
162, 163, 180, 185, 205, 212, 223, 332, 324, 353, 531, 591, 601, 614, 165, 686, 689, 694, 
803, 808). Defendant also presented argument on those motions, sometimes with the help 
of Mr. Ljungberg (R. 1083:30-44, 92, 93, 96-100, 118-125). Finally, Judge Stirba 
repeatedly explained to defendant that he had the right to be represented by counsel, 
thereby providing defendant with several opportunities to revoke his waiver and invoke his 
right to be represented fully by counsel (R. 1083:5-12, 100, 112. 113, 114). Defendant 
never took those opportunities. 
Between the colloquy and the record, therefore, there can be no doubt that defendant 
was well aware of the consequences of his choice to proceed pro se and any dangers or 
disadvantages in his doing so. Defendant's waiver of the full representation of counsel was 
therefore knowing and intelligent. 
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C. Defendant did not invoke his Sixth Amendment right to the full representation of 
counsel after he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. 
Defendant finally argues that after the initial colloquy with the district court but 
before trial, he specifically and unequivocally invoked his Sixth Amendment right to be 
represented by counsel and that the trial court erred in not appointing counsel to represent 
him. Br. Aplt. at 20-24. While defendant is correct in suggesting that a defendant may 
invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel after having made a valid waiver, (cites), a 
review of the record demonstrates that defendant made no such invocation in this case. 
Defendant points to two documents he filed with the court as evidence that he 
invoked his right to counsel before trial. In the first one, entitled "Judicial Notice under 
Rule 201; Rule 16(g), and Sunshine Law," defendant referred to a letter he wrote to Mr. 
Ljungberg, demanding to know 
the exact nature and cause of the accusations made. Accused Defendant 
refused to waive any right of counsel, in as much as Counsel for the Plaintiff, 
Mr. Wade S. Winegar, the Third District Court, under the honorable Ann M. 
Stirba and Court Appointed Standby Counsel for Defense, Robin K. 
Ljungberg are considered to be ineffective in providing the exact nature and 
cause as required under The above said Constitutional Laws. 
(R. 651, 653) (emphasis added). (A copy is attached as Addendum D). The second 
document, entitled "Object to Continuance of Standby Counsel," and filed approximately 
one week later, stated: 
Comes Now Accused Defendant, to notice the above captioned Court that 
accused defendant does not waive any constitutional rights including the right to 
counsel that defendant can repose confidence in. 
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Accused defendant cannot repose confidence in standby counsel Robin K. 
Ljungberg for the following reasons and therefore request the appointment of 
counsel that accused defendant can repose confidence in: 
1. Standby counsel will not return phone calls promptly. 
2. Standby counsel will not schedule appropriate meetings to discuss trial 
strategy. 
3. Standby counsel has no knowledge of the taxing statutes. 
4. Standby counsel has no knowledge of what the subject of the tax is and 
therefore is unable to advise the accused defendant as to a defense strategy. 
5. Standby counsel has refused to explain the nature and cause of the 
accusation against the accused defendant. 
Accused Defendant requests a "Marsden" on this matter prior to trial at the 
Court's earliest convenience. 
(R. 686-87). (A copy is attached as Addendum E). 
Defendant essentially argues that these written "refusals" to waive counsel put the 
district court on notice that he was invoking his right to counsel and that counsel should 
have therefore been appointed. Br. Aplt. 20-25. Subsequent hearings in which these 
documents were discussed, however, do not support defendant's contention. 
At an August 7, 1997 hearing, Judge Stirba asked defendant to address his concerns 
regarding Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel (R. 1083:96-100). (A copy of a partial 
transcript of this hearing is attached as Addendum F). Defendant made some argument 
about having a contract with the court and then generally demanded his "constitutional 
rights." (1083:99). The judge responded that criminal defendants have many constitutiona 
rights, including the right to counsel, "if you choose to have counsel." (R. 1083:99-100). 
Judge Stirba essentially treated defendant's objection as a request for substitute 
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counsel (R. 1083:98-116). After listening to defendant's concerns and Ljungberg's 
response, the court found that Ljungberg was providing reasonable representation as 
standby counsel (R. 1083:112-16). Consequently, the court denied defendant's request (R. 
1083:16). Before doing so, however, the court again advised defendant of his right to 
counsel, stating that she would appoint counsel to represent defendant, except that he had 
chosen to represent himself with the assistance of counsel (R. 1083:112). Defendant did 
not correct the court's perception of his wishes regarding representation, nor did he tell the 
court that he wanted counsel appointed. Thus, defendant did not invoke his right to counsel 
at this hearing.10 
That defendant was not invoking his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the above 
pleadings or in the subsequent hearing is also born out by defendant's statements at trial 
five days later. Before trial began, defendant asked that he be allowed to have 'lax expert" 
assisting him at counsel table (R. 1043:10). Defendant explained to the court "that the 
assistance of counsel is paralegal" (R. 1043:12). Defendant then introduced a man whom 
10Defendant asserts that implicit in the trial court's ruling denying his objection to 
standby counsel is a finding that defendant was choosing the right to represent himself. 
Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant argues that this finding was clearly erroneous and that 
defendant's request for substitute counsel neither constituted a waiver of the right to 
counsel nor an invocation of the right to self-representation. Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant's 
argument misses the point. The trial court had already found that defendant had waived 
his right to counsel when he asked for and was granted the right to represent himself with 
the assistance of standby counsel. The trial court's statements that defendant had chosen 
to represent himself was merely an observation that the trial court understood that 
defendant still wished this to be the case. As stated, if this was a mistake on the trial 
court's part, defendant acquiesced in it. 
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he claimed to be a paralegal and an ""expert" in tax matters (R. 1043:12-13, 118-19). 
Although this man was not a licensed attorney, defendant apparently viewed his help 
as ""the assistance of counsel" (R. 1043: 118). Defendant stated, 
And I have pled before the Court that I have assistance of counsel with regards to 
tax matters. Now, Mr. Smith is very conversant. He teaches classes with regards to 
it. He has attended law classes with me in regards to the tax and to law procedure. . . 
. And I would appreciate having that type of counsel. That fs what I've been asking 
for in the court and trying to make my statements by saying Mr. Ljungberg does not 
have expertise in tax or tax law" 
(R. 1043:118-19). 
In view of the foregoing, it is relatively clear that whenever defendant asserted the 
""right to expert counsel," he was merely asserting that he had the right to have someone 
whom he viewed to be a tax expert assist him at trial, even though he was not a licensed 
attorney. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to representation by a lay 
person, therefore defendant's statements do not amount to an invocation of the 
constitutional right to counsel. State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam): State v. Barlow, 771 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah App. 1989). 
In short, defendant has not pointed to a single instance after his initial colloquy with 
the district court where defendant expressly invoked his right to be represented by a the 
type of counsel contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. Defendant's claim on this point 
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therefore fails.11 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED REQUESTED 
The State requests that this matter be set for oral argument and that a published 
opinion issue. This case presents novel and important issues regarding what constitutes a 
valid waiver of the right to counsel and to what extent the role of standby counsel affects 
that determination. Oral argument may also be helpful given the factual and procedural 
complexities of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jf^_ day of v S ^ W ^ t ^ u . , 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^J^>/^y^^ 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
11
 As a final point, defendant argues that the appointment of standby counsel did 
not satisfy defendant's right to counsel. Br. Aplt. 25-26. As defendant waived his right 
to represented flilly by counsel, the State sees no need to address this issue. Obviously, if 
the State is incorrect regarding its argument that defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived counsel, defendant is entitled to a new trial. See State v. Bakalov. 862 P.2d 1354 
(Utah 1993) (new trial proper remedy for denial of right to self-representation). 
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ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
A m e n d V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation 
A r t
 L $ 1 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1 6 
77-1-6 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 21. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) lb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) lb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) lb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
ADDENDUM B 
Transcript of Initial Hearing Before Judge Nehring 
P R O C E E D I N G S . 
MR. LEE: Your Honor, we're ready to proceed 
on the DeYoung matter. Scott Lee appearing for the 
state, Your Honor; and Mr. White or Mr. White 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LEE: And mess up the roll call today. 
The first appearance of the defendant before the Court, 
I believe it was when we first met Mrs. DeYoung. Since 
that time, Mr. DeYoung has sent to the state a document 
called "Notice of Refusal for Fraud," and I wondered if 
the Court had received a similar document. 
THE COURT: It was in the file. 
MR. LEE: Okay. It's the request of the state 
today, Your Honor, to determine whether or not 
Mr. DeYoung is actually going to represent himself in 
this case. If not, I could require him to make it on 
the record. If not and if Mr. Quinlan recommends that 
Mr. DeYoung be the focus in the state's action, 
Mr. Quinlan will be the one to file pleadings on behalf 
of the defendant, and Mr. Quinlan will be the one to 
represent and to be the voice for Mr. DeYoung in this 
hearing. 
THE COURT: I'd like to hear from you on this 
subject, Mr. DeYoung, the subject being your 
representation in this matter. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Your Honor, this is a Title 10, 
U.S.C. 1 flag. The American -- it's listed here as a 
piece --
THE COURT: Well — all right. What I want to 
do is I want you to restrict your comments to the 
subject of representation of counsel. So with that in 
mind, talking about representation of counsel. 
MR. DEYOUNG: I would like to, for the record, 
declare that this court is a common law court. 
THE COURT: Well, you've made your 
declaration. Let's talk about whether you want 
counsel. I disagree with you, but let's go to the 
appointment of counsel. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Well, I stand under the 
sovereignty of the flag; and therefore, my jurisdiction 
is obviously different from your jurisdiction at this 
point. We don't have a jury under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 7B. I am only too happy to address the 
matter of representation. 
I've met with Mr. Youngberg this morning. 
Mr. Youngberg has expressed that he has represented one 
tax matter, and it is my understanding that I am 
entitled to expert counsel. I require assistance of 
counsel because I am not an attorney. I'm not 
representing myself as an attorney. I'm a citizen in 
party. 
Therefore, I'm entitled to my rights. And 
under the Sixth Amendment, I am entitled to counsel. 
THE COURT: But your right to counsel does not 
include the right to a particular type of counsel or to 
a particular expertise held by counsel. And the United 
States Supreme Court has made that abundantly clear. 
You're not -- I'm sure you're not entitled to someone 
who might by training or experience be entitled to 
proffer himself or herself an attorney that's a tax 
lawyer, for example. Mr. Youngberg, what's your take 
on this? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, big complication, 
Judge. I believe that Mr. DeYoung has a handle on the 
issues that he wishes to litigate. I would be willing 
just to act as standby counsel as far as the criminal 
procedure aspects, but I do believe that some of the 
defenses are going to be defenses that Mr. DeYoung is 
going to have to argue and raise himself. This would 
not be something that I would be comfortable in 
raising. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, and I suspect that 
you're not going to be comfortable with raising it 
because you feel that it would breach an ethical duty 
that you're charged with. The fact you would argue 
legal points that are (inaudible). 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Yeah. There are some issues 
under the State Criminal Code, Judge, that I think are 
addressed -- that Mr. DeYoung believes are addressed 
through a different code. And we have some 
disagreements as to that. 
THE COURT: And wasn't it appointed to 
(inaudible)? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: I believe I was initially 
assigned to him, Judge — when the case was transferred 
to West Valley, the case was transferred to me, as 
well, since I've served in this court. 
MR. LEE: My apologies, Your Honor; I 
apologize. 
MR. DEYOUNG: If I may, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MR. DEYOUNG: I was incarcerated under a 
warrant for — at which point under Judge Hutchings in 
jail. I was then appointed on a pretrial issue counsel 
of Mr. Quinlan; but Judge Hutchings referred this case 
to the West Valley Court, to you specifically. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Just because what I think 
I'm going to do is to -- I'm going to authorize Mr. --
the appointment of Mr. Youngberg to continue in court 
with Mr. DeYoung to serve as standby counsel. I'm not 
going to schedule a (inaudible) at this point. Let's 
wait and see what happens; and if further issues arise 
down the road concerning the counsel issue, all I can 
say is to keep an open view and an open mind and we'll 
look at them. 
Now, that leads us to our next issue. Is this 
on for (inaudible) today? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Today, yes. I believe we're 
requesting it during the hearing. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Yes, we are. 
THE COURT: And that's with your schedule? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: That's okay. 
MR. LEE: What we have, Your Honor, given the 
fact that Mr. Youngberg will continue to act as counsel 
for Mr. DeYoung, may we expect that the pleadings filed 
in the case will come from Mr. Youngberg's office and 
conform with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Utah Rules of Evidence provided with content? 
MR. DEYOUNG: I would object to that, Your 
Honor. 
MR. LEE: Well, and I understand the purpose 
of his objection, but I think we're entitled to counsel 
involved in the case to plead the case in a 
standardized manner. 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LEE: And that's what we're looking for. 
THE COURT: All right. At this point, 
Mr. Hicks, here's what I have before me. I have a 
paper that's entitled "Notice of Refusal for Fraud,11 
that on its face doesn't impress me. It raises 
questions concerning the merits of the case. 
On the other hand, I'm disinclined to exercise 
prior restraint when it comes to papers that are filed. 
And then the limits that you suggest, the conditions 
for filing seem entirely appropriate for what you want, 
are papers filed with the Court that follow the rules 
and comply with the law. 
But at this point, I'm going to leave the door 
open for Mr. DeYoung to file papers. Let's see what 
happens. And, Mr. DeYoung, I'm going to put you on 
notice that I really have to have a whole lot of 
patience for your papers that I feel are inappropriate, 
(inaudible), neither substantive (inaudible) or the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
But I'm not going to close the door. Go ahead 
and file papers, at least at this stage in the 
proceedings. 
MR. LEE: Thank you, Your Honor. I think 
that's appropriate, and I appreciate the Court's ruling 
in that regard. The Court did not — or, excuse me, 
the state does not intend, however, at this point to 
respond to this notice of refusal for fraud unless 
ordered by the court to do so. We would expect that 
future pleadings would have a recognizable heading, 
something for which the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require a response. And then we certainly can respond 
to any of those pleadings that he files. 
THE COURT: And I haven't been (inaudible). 
As far as I'm concerned, a notice is a notice. As far 
as I'm concerned, the paper's in the file. Clear? 
MR. DEYOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. DeYoung. If you'll 
come over here, we'll give you a date. 
MR. LEE: With regard to discovery, I just 
want to reflect to the Legal Defenders Office, we 
intend to provide that discovery to Legal Defenders. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Thank you. 
MR. LEE: In fact, I filed it yesterday. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: And just for future reference, I 
think that the state's communications feel -- and this 
is for your benefit, Mr. DeYoung -- the state's 
communication was sent to Mr. Youngberg. Were he 
(inaudible) the state would communicate directly with 
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you. And they --
MR. YOUNGBERG: That's correct. Thank you. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Thank you. 
MR. LEE: May I be excused? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. LEE: Thank you. 
* * * * 
HEARING, FEBRUARY 11, 1997 
THE COURT: Let's go to the matter of the 
State of Utah v. DeYoung. 
MR. WINEGAR: Wade Winegar on behalf of the 
state of Utah. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? What was your name? 
MR. WINEGAR: Wade Winegar. 
THE COURT: Mr. Winegar. Good to see you, 
again. Mr. DeYoung, including Mr. Youngberg, as well, 
as I understand. 
MR. DEYOUNG: Your Honor, I've been looking 
for Mr. Youngberg, and possibly I'd like to file a 
petition in regards to having possibly other counsel. 
I've had a heck of a time meeting with Mr. Youngberg 
and getting all the details worked out, et cetera. And 
I petition the Court possibly for another --
THE COURT: Well, what I'm going to do is 
we're going to wait for Mr. Youngberg. I want to hear 
11 
ADDENDUM C 
Partial Transcript of Initial Hearing Before Judge Stirba 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1997, 12:01 AM 
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MR. LJUNGBERG: Your Honor, I bribed my way to 
the front of the line by --
THE COURT: Did you? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: — agreeing to buy Mr. Dellapiana 
lunch if he lets me go next. 
THE COURT: Well, make a good lunch. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: We1re No. 3 on the calendar, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Mr. DeYoung. 
THE COURT: State versus Rulon DeYoung, set for— 
except if Mr. Dellapiana is still here, how are you going 
to buy him lunch? 
MR. WINEGAR: I have to go buy it and bring it 
back. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: But Mr. DeYoungfs been waiting a 
long time, so — 
THE COURT: He has been waiting a long time. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: — let's get him out of here. 
THE COURT: All right, are you Rulon F. DeYoung? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I am citizen-party Rulon Frederick 
DeYoung, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: 
this action then? 
MR. 
the Title 1 — 
DeYOUNG 
- Title 
sovereign citizen of 
to declare th: 
THE 
LS court 
COURT: 
I take it, then, that 
is represented by Rob 
state is --
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
General's Off. 
THE 
Very well. 
MR. 
THE 
WINEGAR 
COURT: 
WINEGAR 
ice. 
COURT: 
All right. Are you the defendant in 
I am coming into this court under 
4 USC 1 flag, which places me as a 
the United States. And I would like 
under this flag. 
I'm not — all right. All right. So 
the defendant is present and that he 
in Ljungberg And counsel for the 
Wade Winegar, Your Honor. 
Wade — 
: Winegar, from the Attorney 
Winegar. Thank you, Mr. Winegar. 
LJUNGBERG: Judge — 
COURT: 
Did Mr. DeYoung enter 
offenses in Division 
MR. 
This is actually set for arraignment. 
a plea of not guilty to these 
II? 
LJUNGBERG: We went through a preliminary 
hearing before Judge 
itfs my recollection 
should clarify to the 
has appointed me as s 
Nehring in Division II, Judge, and 
that he was arraigned at that time. I 
Court that I believe Judge Nehring 
tandby counsel. Mr. DeYoung had 
3 ! 
indicated 
something 
arraigned 
a desire to represent himself, and that's 
that we need to clarify today, obviously. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: It's my recollection that he was 
at that level. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: I don't specifically remember that, 
to be frank. If we could just get that taken care of so 
there's no question. 
THE COURT: All right. Certainly. Mr. DeYoung, 
is Mr. Ljungberg your counsel or do you wish him to be 
standby counsel for you? 
MR. DeYOUNG: Your Honor, on our January roll 
call before Judge Nehring, it was determined in that 
hearing that, in meeting with Mr. Ljungberg that morning, 
Mr. Ljungberg was not a — familiar with tax law. And 
seeing that the charges by the State in this matter is 
pertaining to tax law, there are several issues that I have 
as a defense that I would like to present before the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, we're not talking 
about those at this time. 
MR. DeYOUNG: I understand that. 
THE COURT: I'm just asking about the status of 
counsel. 
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12 
13 
1 MR. DeYOUNG: And, at that point, you see, 
2 Judge Nehring did rule to the effect that I would be able 
3 to represent myself as a citizen in party and have 
4 J Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel. 
i 
5 I THE COURT: I see. Mr. DeYoung, I'd like you to 
6 be sworn in. Would you raise your right hand to be sworn 
7 I in? 
8 (Whereupon, the oath was administered 
9 j to the defendant by the clerk.) 
MR. DeYOUNG: To the best of my ability. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung, I just want 
to make sure that you understand that you have a right to 
be represented by counsel in this criminal action against 
14 J you. Do you understand that you have a right to be 
15 
16 
represented by an attorney? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I do have an understanding that I 
17 I have a right to be represented. I have asked the previous 
18 I court for counsel that could represent me in regards to tax 
19 i matters, 
20 I THE COURT: All right. It evidently has been 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
determined that you do not have the funds available to pay 
for your own attorney to represent you. Is that correct? 
MR. DeYOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so you need to have counsel 
appointed for you; is that correct? 
5 
1 MR. DeYOUNG: To my understanding, Mr. -- and 
2 J with the understanding that I have with Mr. Ljungberg, he 
3 is willing to assist me in regards to the presence of the 
4 I Court. Mr. Ljungberg expressed that morning in that j 
5 meeting that there are certain issues that he would have 
6 problems in presenting before the Court, 
7 I THE COURT: I see. 
8 j MR. DeYOUNG: And, therefore, he is -- he 
9 ! admitted or agreed that he would assist, 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I don't know if there's 
ever been a finding that he is indeed indigent and needs 
representation. At the first appearance, the judge gave 
him representation of counsel, and --
THE COURT: Well, also, I believe that LDA has 
its own screening as to that status; is that correct? 
18 MR. LJUNGBERG: We generally have — the State 
requires that we have an -- not an affidavit, but an 
information form that's filled out by our clients that does 
indicate whether or not they're indigent. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm not trying to 
open up that door. I don't usually. And I don't have any 
basis presented to me on which to unappoint Mr. Ljungberg— 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Well, It appears that he may — 
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iYoung, 
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I'm not planning to proceed 
Is some evidence to 
hearing 
that 
have 
if 
on that. Howeve 
you do have the 
support that, 
on that 
then we 
ir, I would advise you, 
means to reta 
the right to retain an attorney 
tin 
at your 
own expense. But since Mr. Ljungberg has been brought in 
by Judge Nehring as counsel or to assist you with this 
case, I'll assume that there's an appropriate basis for 
that and proceed. 
Now, Mr. DeYoung, I understand your position is 
that you would not mind, or — well, that you would not 
mind having counsel appointed to represent you, but an 
attorney who is, in essence, a tax attorney or who has 
expertise in tax law; is that correct? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I would — I would hope to be able 
to have representation to the quality that I would be able 
to bring forth the issues on the tax matters that I'm 
entitled to. Mr. --
THE COURT: My question was --
MR. DeYOUNG: Judge — 
THE COURT: -- simply answerable by yes or no. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Okay. 
THE COURT: And my question was: Is it -- am I 
correct in understanding that you would not mind having 
counsel appointed to represent you so long as that counsel 
1 had expertise in tax law or was a tax lawyer, presumably 
2 with some criminal law expertise as well? Is that correct, 
3 Mr. DeYoung? 
4 MR. DeYOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Then — however, 
6 Mr. DeYoung, by contract, LDA are the attorneys available 
7 to the court for appointment in cases. And this is a 
8 criminal case. And I'm not aware of any other attorney at 
9 I LDA who has the kind of expertise that you were looking 
for. 
Is that correct, Mr. Ljungberg? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: I've made some inquiry, Judge. 
The only attorney that's -- that's even been involved in 
any sort of accounting or tax issues would be Miss Stam, 
and it's been about 20 -- 15 years ago, something like 
that. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 MR. LJUNGBERG: And so she — she would n o t , I 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
don't think, meet criteria as an expert in tax matters at 
20 I this point, 
THE COURT: And there's no — the only departure 
from appointing LDA is if there is a conflict of interest 
within LDA, and then there are contract attorneys. But as 
I understand it, there's no conflict that's being raised 
25 I here that would preclude LDA from appearing in this case. 
Is that correct, Mr. Ljungberg? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Up to this point there has been 
no — 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: — conflict of interest, I don't 
believe. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeYoung, not having before me the 
colloquy between you and Judge Nehring, I'm going to be 
asking you some questions about your ability to represent 
yourself. Now, you do have the right to appear in your own 
defense, if you wish. You have the right to be represented 
by counsel also. So, if you wish to be represented by 
counsel rather than conduct your own defense, you certainly 
have the right to have that occur. 
You do not have the right to have a specific 
attorney appointed to represent you, or even one with 
specific tax background, and there are several reasons for 
that, one of which is that -- are the framework of which we 
have LDA and other attorneys available to the court. This 
is how the appointment process works. I can't simply call 
on somebody else and appoint somebody else merely because 
you wish to have someone with -- with some tax background. 
But, what is your educational background? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I have three years of college. 
THE COURT: And, how old are you? 
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COURT: 
In administrative levels, yes, Your 
All right. And on how many 
Two others. 
And how long ago were they? 
In the last year. j 
I see. And you felt -- did you feel 
comfortable with how you handled the responsibilities of 
representing yourself? 
have gone 
the law f 
MR. DeYOUNG 
to classes, 
or a 
I was comfortable to a point. I 
legal classes, and have been studying 
number of years. I have qualified myself as 
a legal researcher and, as a result, unfortunately, I do 
not have ' the presence 
this is new for me to 
courtroom And so --
of the court. And so this is all — 
know the procedure within the 
and, of course, this is why I asked 
10 
Mr. Ljungberg to assist me, so that I would be well within 
the procedure and the rule of the court. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
you could — if he represented you, if you preferred that, 
he would still be representing you but that you would be 
assisting him in your representation as a client. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. DeYOUNG: You're — you're saying that I 
would not be opted --
THE COURT: No, no — 
MR. DeYOUNG: — to proceed at representing 
myself and having standby counsel? 
THE COURT: No. That's not what I meant. Let me 
state this in a different way. 
Do you understand you also have the option of 
assisting Mr. Ljungberg, if he were actually representing 
you and was not just standby counsel? In other words --
MR. DeYOUNG: I — I can understand that. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
you have that right? 
MR. DeYOUNG: That is an option. 
THE COURT: All right. And, you've thought about 
this, have you? About whether that is -- representing 
yourself is a better way for you to proceed, in light of 
your concerns and your issues? 
11 
1 MR. DeYOUNG: Well, if I understand Mr. Ljungberg 
2 j correctly, there are matters that he would be uncomfortable 
3 in presenting in my defense. And I feel that I definitely 
4 have a defense that should be raised before the Court. 
5 THE COURT: I see. 
6 MR. LJUNGBERG: That is accurate, Judge. There 
7 are some legal arguments that I would feel uncomfortable, 
8 in an ethical setting, presenting as fact. And so I think 
9 | that's why Mr. DeYoung and I came to this compromise. 
THE COURT: I see. 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, the only concern that 
the State has -- with people that, in the past, I've known 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 tax protesters, they seem to want to fight a paper war, 
15 
16 
17 
Between the filing of charges and the preliminary hearing, 
we had about twenty motions, all of which were denied. And 
since the bindover we have had three motions, one of which 
18 j we need to address is a notice of deposition and a summons 
19 I to a tax investigator and other people. We've got a real 
20 problem with him following the rules of criminal procedure 
21 and just deluging us with — with paper that -- he'll cite 
22 Army regulations and this 4 USC 1 flag of peace and all 
23 these different things that are really irrelevant, 
24 completely irrelevant, to these matters. And we would ask 
25 that there be at least some mechanism in place so that we 
12 
don't have to 
I think 
colloquy 
respond to every single motion. And before, 
it was Judge Nehring, what he did --
THE COURT: Well, I actually wasn't done with my 
Why don't you wait for just a moment, 
Mr, DeYoung — 
capable 
will be 
pleading 
be, that 
MR. 
THE 
Mr. 
WINEGAR: All right. 
COURT: -- or, excuse me, Mr. Winegar. 
DeYoung, do you feel that you are reasonably 
of representing yourself in this proceeding? 
MR. 
THE 
DeYOUNG: I do. 
COURT: All right. And that Mr. Ljungberg 
available to assist you with the preparation of 
s, with assisting you with your defense, as need 
sort 
MR. 
of thing? 
DeYOUNG: Unfortunately, Your Honor, up to 
this point Mr. Ljungberg's caseload is -- is extreme. He 
is a very difficult person to get a hold of, as are all the 
attorneys under LDA. 
THE COURT: Well, I presume you're just — you 
don't know that personally. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Well — 
THE COURT: But anyway, go ahead Mr. DeYoung. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Virtually, you know, that tends to 
appear to be that way. And I know, you know, that 
Mr. Ljungberg has been very gracious in making himself 
13 
1 available on the occasions that we've been able to get 
2 together. 
3 THE COURT: All right. 
4 MR. DeYOUNG: And I would reserve the right to be 
5 able to submit pleadings as I see benefitted for my case. 
6 And so I would request that. 
7 THE COURT: I see. All right. Is there any 
8 I reason why you feel you'd be uncomfortable or unable to 
9 I represent yourself in this matter with Mr. Ljungberg 
10 I assisting you? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I would be very comfortable having 
Mr. Ljungberg assisting me, if that is a possibility. 
THE COURT: It is. And, based on this, I find 
that you understand the consequences of representing 
yourself, and appear to have the ability to do so. 
Now, do you understand -- one other thing, 
though, Mr. DeYoung. You are obliged, as is any other 
18 | individual representing himself or herself or represented 
19 J by counsel, to file pleadings that are consistent with the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah law and federal 
constitutional law as well. Do you understand that? 
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22 MR. DeYOUNG: I — I fully understand the federal 
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constitutional law. I understand the Utah laws, as they 
attach to the federal law. And I would -- in response to 
Mr. Winegar's view — 
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THE COURT: Well, I didn't ask you about that. 
MR. DeYOUNG: I understand that but — 
THE COURT: I didn't ask you about that. Let's 
I take — answer my question first. So you do feel 
comfortable in proceeding, correct? 
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MR. DeYOUNG: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. And you understand that 
to comply with the Rules of Criminal Procedure — 
MR. DeYOUNG: I do. 
THE COURT: — Utah statute and federal 
ional law. You understand that? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I do. 
THE COURT: Very well, then. I will permit 
ng to represent himself. He appears to me to be 
i to do so and understands the consequences of his doing 
that 
isel, 
he's held to the same requirements as would be 
if he were being represented by Mr. Ljungberg, and 
that it is appropriate for Mr. Ljungberg to assist 
Mr. 
And 
DeYou 
that1 
procedure 
procedure 
memoranda 
any other 
ng insofar as he feels he ethically can do so. 
s the basis on which we'll proceed. 
With regard to Mr. Winegar's request for a 
, I think that unless I order otherwise, the 
shall simply be that all pleadings, motions and 
and otherwise shall be filed in this case, as in 
case, in accordance with the Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure, Utah statutory law, and State and federal 
I constitutional law. And I'm not going to put a prior 
restraint on Mr. DeYoung with regard to the filing of 
motions. 
I If, for some reason, it later appears that 
another order other than this needs to be entered, then I 
shall do so, if it appears to be appropriate. Under the 
circumstances, what we will do at this time is set some — 
j a pretrial schedule, a trial date, a pretrial date, and a 
date by which all motions shall be filed. 
I Now, Mr. DeYoung, I indicated that the third date 
i 
j I'd be setting would be a date by which all pretrial 
motions, except motions in limine, shall be filed. Now, 
with regard to the amount of time needed for trial, how 
| many days do you believe that the trial will take? 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I believe that we can 
present the State's case within a day. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe that 
Mr. DeYoung has more than three or four witnesses that he 
would be wanting to call, so I would think that his case 
would probably run into two days. 
THE COURT: Two days himself or — 
MR. LJUNGBERG: On top of — yeah, on top of the 
16 
ADDENDUM D 
D's Pro Se "Judicial Notice under Rule 201; Rule 16(g), and Sunshine Law" 
American Flag 
Rulon Frederick, DeYoung 
3475 Highland Drive #A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 487-4142 
Robin K. Ljungberg, Standby Counsel 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (901) 532-5444 
m 
of Peace (Title 4 C.S.C. $1) of the^fiitei 
Third District Court 
State Of Utah 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Rulon Frederick, De Young 
Accused Defendant. 
Inc. Case No. 971900227 FS 
Judicial iNotice Under Rule 201; 
Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law 
(Explanation of Attached Exhibits) 
Judge Ann M. Stirba 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(g) 
and Sunshine Law, Accused Defendant comes forward with the following Exhibits which were 
inadvertently overlooked at the time of filing, due to the rush of getting into town in the traffic and 
filing the Judicial Notice before 5:00 P.M. The following is submitted for explanation purposes 
only (underlined), which should have been submitted with the original filing: 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law (Exhibits that were to be attached) 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 1 of 3 plus attachments 
Item # 2) Prosecution is withholding evidence as requested under Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 16(e) of which correspondence copies are attached (Exhibits 1. 4. 5. 7, 8, 8(a) 
and 9). Plaintiff/Prosecutor has denied Accused Defendant due process rights of full disclosure 
under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16, Discovery. 
Item #3) Accused Defendant requested under Rule 16(e) to have a list of 
empioyees/supervisor(s) which have directly or indirectly been involved in the decision making 
process as to certain determinations by the Utah State Tax Commission or Internal Revenue 
Service that Accused Defendant is a "taxpayer" and "subject to" a income tax under the Internal 
Revenue Code and Utah Code Annotated. This request was denied by Prosecutor Winegar as 
evidenced in the response letter of June 25, 1997 (Exhibit 3) and phone call conversation between 
Mr. Winegar and Accused Defendant on the morning of June 23, 1997 (Exhibit 3) as averred in the 
letter to Mr. Robin K. Ljungberg dated June 26, 1997 (Exhibit 2). Denied the defense of 
inspection, testing or copying discovery from the source that must have documentation, records, 
statements, rulings and personnel which has created a dilemma for the court, in that defense shall 
require considerable more time for examination in behalf of the defense during trial. Accused 
Defendant finds it most interesting that Mr. Winegar pledges equal protection under due process of 
the fundamental law on paper, only to suppress it, disparage it and flat out deny it while generating 
allegations. 
Item #4) In a letter dated on June 26, 1997 (Exhibit 2), Accused Defendant demanded from 
Court Appointed Standby Counsel, Robin K. Ljungberg the exact nature and cause of the 
accusations made (letter attached, Exhibit 2). Accused Defendant refuses to waive any right of 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law (Exhibits that were to be attached) 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 2 of 3 plus attachments 
counsel, in as much as Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Wade S. Winegar, the Third District Court, 
under the honorable Judge Ann M. Stirba and Court Appointed Standby Counsel for Defense, 
Robin K. Ljungberg are considered to be ineffective in provulinfi the exact nature and cause as 
required under The above said Constitutional Laws. 
/ 
Accused Defendant hereby respectfully submits the attached copies of the letters ^outlined in 
i / 
items # 2 through 4 which are indicated within the original JudiciaKNotice UnderRule 201* Rule 
K 1 * l 
16(g); and Sunshine Law as filed with the above Court on July 17, V99Y at 5:01 P.M. 
Dated: July 17, 1997 \ 
RulohNFrederick, DeYoungV ^ - I 
Sovereign Individual, 
Accused Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, hereby certify that I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDICIAL 
NOTICE UNDER RULE 201: RULE 16(g); AND SUNSHINE LAW (EXPLANATION OF 
ATTACHED EXHIBITS), by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid or 
delivering in person on July 17, 1997 addressed to the following: 
Jan Graham, Esq. (1231) 
Attorney General 
Scott Reed, Esq. (4124) 
Kirk Torgensen, Esq. (4927) 
WadeS. Winegar, Esq. (5561) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dated: July 17, 1997 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law (Exhibits that were 
Case No 971900227 FS 
Page 3 of 3 plus attachments 
ADDENDUM E 
Defendant's Pro Se "Object to Standby Counsel" 
Rulon Frederick, De Young 
C/O 3475 Highland Drive #A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 487-4142 
Robin K. Ljungberg, Standby Counsel 
American Flag of Peace (Title 4 U.S.C. {!) ol 
Third District Court 
Utah State 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
Rulon Frederick, De Young 
Accused Defendant. 
Inc. Case No. 971900227 FS 
OBJECT TO CONTINUANCE OF 
STANDBY COUNSEL 
Judge Ann M. Stirba 
NOTICE 
Responsibility Disclaimer under U.C.C. 3-501: Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a) the case titled above 
is under the title 4 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, American Flag of Peace, This Case is under the Jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Const., art. Ill, §§ 1 and 2. No Admiralty or Maritime Jurisdiction will be allowed in the 
Jurisdicuon of the above captioned case. No titles of nobility under any foreign flag jurisdiction and 
in breach of U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, will be allowed in the Jurisdiction of this case. Breach of this 
contract will cause sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). If the Constitution of the united States is 
surrendered to a foreign power to cause the breach of contract, of Oath and Affirmation, to the 
Constitution of the united States of America, then charges for perjury of Oath and Constructive 
Treason, and contempt for the Constitution of the united States of America, will be brought against 
the Officers of the Court responsible. 
No review of this Motion will be allowed (Hake v. Clarke. 91 F. 3d, 1129 (8th Cir 1996)), acceptance 
of this Motion by the Clerk of this Court constitutes a contract guaranteeing Plaintiff a U. S. Const. 
amend. VII jury trial. Breech of this contract can cause an additional action against those who cause 
such breech. 
Objection to Continuance of Standby Counsel 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 1 of 2 
e o i (} \ 6 
COMES NOW Accused Defendant, to notice the above captioned Court that accused defendant 
does not waive any constitutional rights including the right to counsel that defendant can repose 
confidence in. 
Accused defendant cannot repose confidence in standby counsel Robin K Ljungberg for the 
following reasons and therefore request the appointment of counsel that accused defendant can 
repose confidence in. 
1. Standby counsel will not return phone calls promptly. 
2. Standby counsel will not schedule appropriate meetings to discuss trial strategy. 
3. Standby counsel has no knowledge of the taxing statutes. 
4. Standby counsel has no knowledge of what the subject of the tax is and therefore is unable 
to advise the accused defendant as to a defense strategy. 
5. Standby counsel has refused to explain the nature and caused die accusation against the 
accused defendant. 
Accused Defendant requests a "Marsden" hearing on this matter pr^ or to trial at th^ Court's 
earliest convenience. 
Dated: July 25, 1997 
Frederick, DeYoung 
Citizen in Party 
Accused Defendant 
Objection to Continuance of Standby Counsel 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 2 of 3 
ADDENDUM F 
Partial Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's "Object to Standby Counsel" 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1997, 8:37 A.M. 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: This is the State versus Rulon 
DeYoung. Mr. DeYoung is present, Mr. Ljungberg is present, 
Mr. Winegar is present. This is the time set for hearing 
several motions, including Mr. DeYoungfs motion in limine 
to exclude the 1983 criminal case; Mr. DeYoungfs motion in 
limine regarding reference to the use of "tax protester" or 
"taxpayer" or other similar terms; the motion in limine 
limiting evidence and testimony; Mr. DeYoung's objection to 
standby counsel and request for the appointment of new 
counsel; the defense motion to compel pursuant to Rule 16 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State's 
motion in limine to prevent -- excuse me — Mr. DeYoung 
from instructing the jury as to the law; the State's motion 
in limine to prohibit the defendant from arguing evidence 
not introduced before the Court or to testify while 
questioning other witnesses. 
All right. Have I overlooked anything? 
Mr. DeYoung? 
MR. DeYOUNG: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. It may be 
prudent to begin with the motion, or the objection 
96 
I 
5 
1 | regarding Mr. Ljungberg. Does — is that still pending 
2 | Mr. DeYoung? Are you still maintaining your objection? 
3 } MR. DeYOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 ! THE COURT: All right. Let's see. Mr. — 
MR. WINEGAR: Judge, there was one thing. I 
6 | think we're also going to address the subpoenas that had 
7 [ been issued. 
8 j THE COURT: That is correct. Thank you. That is 
9 I correct. And I have looked at those subpoenas. All right. 
10 Thank you. 
11 | Mr. DeYoung, I would like you to tell me what 
12 your argument is with regard to your objection to 
13 Mr. Ljungberg. One other matter. I scheduled an hour for 
14 this. I need to communicate with Judge Thorne, and so that 
15 puts us at about 9:45 all together. We thought that we'd 
15 be able accomplish what we needed to accomplish here today 
17 I in that time. So because there are numerous matters we 
18 need to deal with, I'd like you to — 
19 MR. DeYOUNG: Keep it brief. 
20 THE COURT: Yes. All right. I have read your 
21 materials. 
22 MR. DeYOUNG: I appreciate that, Your Honor. 
23 There's some administrative matters that I would like to 
24 bring before the Court. Prior to all of that, I wish to 
25 state that this is a Title 4 USC 1 Flag. I wish to call 
97 
1 two witnesses to come before this stand, if I may. 
2 THE COURT: This, actually, has only been set for 
3 oral argument. And I am not sure how the two — 
4
 MR. DeYOUNG: This ~ 
5 THE COURT: — tie together, but I — 
6 MR. DeYOUNG: ~ this is a — 
7 THE COURT: This is the time set for what you 
8 have to tell me regarding the objection to Mr. Ljungberg. 
9 ! MR. DeYOUNG: I recognize that fact, but under — 
10 as I will unfold to the Court, I will show the Court the 
11 reason for thus stating and having witnesses to that fact. 
12 THE COURT: Why don't you tell me what it is you 
13 want me to hear about your objection to Mr. Ljungberg and 
14 then I will address whether we'll permit any evidence after 
15 I hear your summary. 
16 MR. DeYOUNG: Well, Your Honor, all lawful human 
17 i intercourse is by contract. And, otherwise, it's outside 
18 ( of contract law in outlawry. Therefore, the 13th Amendment 
19 I prohibits involuntary servitude. I need a contract with 
20 this court. I have filed accordingly. There is a contract 
21 according to the filing with the clerk. I have stated in 
22 each hearing that I've appeared before the court that this 
23 is a Title 4 USC 1 flag. I desire — 
24 THE COURT: Stop there. I have ruled on the 
25 issue about the flag. I will hear no more discussion about 
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I the flag 
say about 
counsel, 
point out 
rights. 
agreement 
constitut 
Court rec 
therefore 
And — 
criminal 
this morning. I am ready to hear what you have to 
your objections to Mr. Ljungberg as standby 
so proceed with that. You may proceed. 
MR. DeYOUNG: 
that I want 
I want to mak 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
the contract of those cons 
e sure that this Court is 
, that we have joinder of party. That 
ional rights, 
ognized that 
, I am demand 
THE COURT: 
defendant, Mr 
that. You may proceed 
MR. DeYOUNG: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DeYOUNG: 
have -- are you saying 
THE COURT: 
constitutional rights 
I wish to 
jtitutional 
in 
under the 
on the first hearing March 10th, the 
I would have constitutiona il rights, 
ing those constitutional rights. 
You have constitutional ri .ghts as a 
. DeYoung, there is no question about 
with your — 
Thank you. 
-- argument about your ob: 
May I just qualify that, 
all? 
Mr. DeYoung, first of all, 
as a criminal defendant. 
include many things such as the right to counsel 
choose to 
right to 
have counsel 
MR. DeYOUNG: 
THE COURT: 
--
Thank you, Your Honor. 
ection. 
that I 
you have 
They 
., if you 
— the right to a speedy trial, the 
persist in your plea of not guilty, be presumed 
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You have a mu! Ltitude c >f rights. Those are just some of 
them. First of all, this is not a discussion here, 
Mr. DeYoung -• 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
DeYOUNG: 
COURT: 
DeYOUNG: 
COURT: 
I recognize — 
-- I am interested in hearing your — 
I — 
Now, hold it. I don 
going to discuss whether I agree with your 
contract. That is not 
your objection to Mr. 
counsel. Now 
MR. 
THE 
I M R . 
leading up to 
THE 
MR. 
get to -
DeYOUNG: 
COURT: 
DeYOUNG: 
--
COURT: 
DeYOUNG: 
other hand, the First 
i United States 
. what this is about. 
Ljungberg continuing 
-
That's — that's — 
— that argument now, 
t - - I am not 
concept of a 
This is about 
as your standby 
That is the part of which I'm 
Well, get to it. 
Okay, Your Honor. But, on the | 
Amendment to the Constitution of the 
of America, it guarantees me free speech, and 
therefore, I ask the Court to address administrative 
matters that would all 
I between myself and the 
ow me and guarantee me a contract 
. court. And that's -— that's all 
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1 I've attempted to do. Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 Now, in addressing the accused, defendant cannot 
3 i repose confidence in standby counsel, Mr. Robin K. 
4 Ljungberg, for the following reasons. And it is not only 
5 Mr. Ljungberg, it is a multiple number of attorneys that 
6 would be qualified to represent me before the court — 
7 THE COURT: We're only talking about 
8 Mr. Ljungberg. Address Mr. Ljungberg, Mr. DeYoung. 
9 i Address him now. 
10 MR. DeYOUNG: Okay. Yes. All right. Therefore, 
11 I I wish to state the following reasons, simply that when the 
12 accused defendant contacted standby counsel, the phone 
12 calls were not returned promptly. Standby counsel --
14 I THE COURT: Can you be more specific with that, 
15 Mr. DeYoung? 
16 MR. DeYOUNG: Unfortunately, Your Honor, I do 
17 have a log of calls, requests, so forth for the needs and 
18 requirements to meet, to discuss, to talk --
19 I THE COURT: Can you give me an estimate, 
20 Mr. DeYoung, about how many times you've tried to contact 
21 Mr. DeYoung — 
22 I MR. DeYOUNG: Mr. Ljungberg. 
23 THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Ljungberg. 
24 MR. DeYOUNG: Yes, I've — I have tried to 
25 contact him numerous times, at least 20 in the last month. 
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THE COURT: By last month, you mean July? 
MR. DeYOUNG: Yes. From the last time we were in 
court, was it — oh, well. I don't see the calendar to 
refer back. But I do have those dates and times and the 
number of times that I spoke with his secretary, Andrea, 
and other secretaries who have answered the phone when 
Andrea is not available. 
In the last month, I've sent faxes to the effect 
asking to get together and asking questions that need to 
have answers to it. Standby counsel, Mr. Ljungberg, has no 
knowledge of the taxing statutes. That was clarified right 
at up front in the preliminary hearing with Judge Nehring. 
Standby counsel has no knowledge of what the subject of the 
tax is and, therefore, is unable to advise the accused 
defendant as to a defense strategy. 
Standby counsel has refused to explain the nature 
and cause of the accusation against the accused defendant. 
Accused defendant has asked that -- and requested of the 
Court for a Marsden hearing, which, in essence, is an ex 
parte motion to determine the competency and the 
effectiveness of an appointed trial attorney. And in this 
case, as the Court has directed me, Robin K. Ljungberg 
during all stages of the trial proceedings. And, 
therefore, Mr. Ljungberg has failed to adequately prepare 
for trial as standby counsel and represent me. 
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1
 Mr. Ljungberg has failed to present an adequate defense 
2 i without conveying the actual nature and cause of the 
3 i allegations made against me. 
4
 Therefore, being effective in a trial defense, 
5 Mr. Ljungberg has failed to seek a continuance to provide 
6 the defense and obtain expert witnesses. Mr. Ljungberg 
7 failed to assist as standby counsel to demand, under Utah 
8 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 16 and under due process of 
9 law vital discovery because I have motioned before the 
10 Court pleadings to the effect that plaintiff is withholding 
11 evidence. 
12 Therefore, under due process, I'm entitled to 
13 vital discovery. Ifm entitled to have knowledge of various 
14 IRS manuals, various Utah State Tax Commission manuals, the 
15 determinations by the Utah State Tax Commissions, the 
16 rulings which are vital to the defense of this case. And 
17 that has been withheld by the prosecutor. I have attempted 
18 those many times. 
19 Mr. Ljungberg has maintain -- has maintained that 
20 as standby counsel, the accused defendant must do what the 
21 defendant must do to present a defense. Because I have 
22 opted to represent my own case and have come forward before 
23 the Court and the Court has determined that that is, under 
24 a colloquy, has provided that opportunity to me. But 
25 I without consulting with a knowledgeable -- he — we have 
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not contacted knowledgeable attorneys who 
subject of the tax, who do understand the 
of tax matters. And, therefore, we would 
dissimilarities in types of cases. 
do know the 
nature and cause 
have 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 I Mr. Ljungberg failed to meet with the accused 
6 j defendant in a timely manner so that the accused defendant 
7 ] would have such criminal trial expertise in the formation 
8 of the defense. Mr- Ljungberg willfully — willful intent 
9 j from the inception of this case, has been, MHow it is 
10 I possible" - -- "How," he has asked me, "How is it possible 
n J to beat the system?" Because it has been pointed out that 
12 I not only is prosecution against me, but prosecution and the 
13 I Court are against me as a system. And, therefore, I have 
14 very little opportunity to overcome that, and why — why 
15 should I fight a system? Which appears and — appeared at 
16 that time and continues to appear to be highly prejudicial 
17 | against the accused defendant. And failure to understand 
18 the subject of a tax -- of the tax as it relates to the 
19 j nature and cause of the allegations of the case is most 
20 detrimental to a concerted defense. 
21 That is the summation of my reasons, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: All right. I didn't hear anything in 
23 there that related to what other witnesses might say. 
24 These — what you've specified here as your objections 
25 against Mr. Ljungberg relate to phone calls that you have 
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4 
1 I placed that he has not returned, communications between you 
2 | and he regarding his knowledge, or lack of knowledge of the 
3 J taxing statutes, his refusal to explain to you the nature 
and cause of accusations, the communications, evidently, 
5 I regarding discovery or of lack of attempts to get 
6 discovery. 
7 MR. DeYOUNG: Well, yah. The enforcement of 
8 being able to have the discovery. That is allowable under 
9 i Rule 60, 
10 THE COURT: Well, what Ifm saying is, I haven't 
n heard anything that would relate to the testimony of any 
12 | other witness. In other words, what you — 
13 MR. DeYOUNG: I, I see — 
14 I COURT: -- said when you started your arguments 
15 J about that. 
16 | MR. DeYOUNG: I recognize that fact, but the file 
17 has -- does reflect, I do have communication between 
18 I Mr. Winegar and myself and I have provided Mr. Ljungberg 
19 with step-by-step directions that I have taken for those 
20 matters. 
21 And according to having assistance of counsel, 
22 and, of course, my question to Mr. Ljungberg in West Valley 
23 court there, prior to going into the proceeding of the 
24 preliminary, or the roll call it was, I asked for his 
25 expertise, as well, to guide me through the court itself so 
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1 that I will meet all of the requirements and the procedures 
2 of the court. That I would not be amiss in any way, shape 
3 or form. And up to a point, Mr. Ljungberg has provided 
4 just that, but when we get down to rulings by the Court, 
5 specifically in regards to returns that were heard, that 
6 were ruled upon, that changed the whole structure of this 
7 case in relation to the defense. And I, at that point, 
8 asked the questions, and that's all I'm asking for. And I 
9 l need the answer, if not from my own standby counsel, I need 
10 it from the plaintiff. If not from the plaintiff, I need 
n | it from the court, and I have pleaded that way in the 
12 ! record. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. DeYoung. 
14 MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Winegar. First as to — oh, 
15 I Mr. DeYoung, who — getting back to your request to call 
17 witnesses before, I just want to make sure I understand. 
18 I Was that in relation to the administrative matters --
19 MR. DeYOUNG: Yes, ma'am. 
20 THE COURT: I see. All right. 
21 MR. DeYOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: All right. And it doesn't relate to 
23 your objection to standby counsel? 
24 MR. DeYOUNG: No, no. Other — other than the 
25 fact that I do have the right under the constitution, under 
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t amendment six to the effect and I can choose my own 
2 spokesperson. I can have the right to choose my own 
3 effective counsel if counsel cannot be afforded me 
4 j through — 
5 THE COURT: Well, you have the right to retain 
6 counsel at your own expense, if you're able to afford 
7 counsel. If you're not able to afford counsel, you are 
8 I entitled to be appointed counsel, or you may have standby 
9 I counsel. You do not have the right to elect who that 
10 counsel is, and you do not have the right to be represented 
n | by someone who is not an attorney licensed to practice law 
12 in the state of Utah. And so that is the reason why I ask 
13 the question. 
14 I MR. DeYOUNG: Could — Could I ask the Court 
15 then, where is that directive? 
16 THE COURT: Ifm not here to answer your 
17 questions, Mr. DeYoung. If you look in the statutes, t h e — 
18 first of all, you have the right to counsel. There are 
19 numerous cases, U.S. Supreme Court cases, Utah Supreme 
20 Court cases, and plenty of case law that is consistent with 
21 exactly the law as I just stated it to you. And I — and 
22 under the Utah Code, only those who are licensed as 
23 attorneys in the state of Utah may represent others in 
24 court. Now, I'm not going to get into that discussion. 
25 That's into something else all together. Now, having heard 
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your objections with regard to Mr. Ljungberg, you may be 
seated and I will hear the State's response to that. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. WINEBERG: Your Honor, I'll be brief on this 
matter. 
It is the State's position that, as Mr. DeYoung 
pointed out, that Mr. Ljungberg is standby counsel. 
Mr. DeYoung has elected to represent himself and Mr. 
Ljungberg is there as standby counsel only. It is the 
State's position also that Mr. DeYoung is looking for 
someone to support his positions. I would be surprised if 
he is going to find any licensed attorney that follows the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct that is going support 
those positions that he has advocated for numerous years. 
There is not an attorney that's going to put his license on 
the line to do that. And the State's position is that if 
he wants to represent himself, he can do that. 
Your Honor has correctly stated the law that, if 
he wants counsel appointed for him, he has counsel, there 
is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Mr. Ljungberg is 
competent counsel and he can do an excellent job as standby 
counsel. I have no doubts, he is a legal defender. He 
also I'm sure has a very busy schedule and is not going to 
be able to pay the personal attention that one would 
receive if he were paying a salary to an attorney. We have 
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argument here 
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and feel that the real 
going to find someone 
Utah State Bar? And we 
feel that he probably is not going to do that. And if he 
wants to proceed by himself, he's 
then he can maintain the standby < 
THE 
Mr. 
COURT: Thank you. 
free to do that. If not, 
counsel that he has. 
Ljungberg, do you have any input you wish to 
1
 make with regard to this? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: I don't 
not conversant with tax law, I'm 
the issue here is a criminal case 
impress upon Mr. DeYoung the fact 
criminal case 
criminal case 
by being a lawyer o 
by communicating to 
all you have to do is look at my 
believe so, Judge. I am 
not a tax lawyer. I think 
, and Ifve tried to 
that you don't win a 
f any kind, but you win a 
the jury. And — I mean, 
~ourt record, my trial 
record, and you will see that I am competent at 
communicating 
THE 
i Mr. DeYoungfs 
telephone you 
returned. 
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 MR. 
to a jury. 
COURT: Well, I am 
representations tha 
numerous times and 
LJUNGBERG: I think 
That is accurate. 
THE COURT: All right. 
concerned about the — 
t he attempted to 
that phone calls were not 
that's accurate, Judge. 
Well, do you wish to go 
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into that more, Mr, DeYoung? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I 
to substantiate the claim 
MR. 
THE 
| MR. 
THE 
LJUNGBERG: 
— I' 
that 
It's 
COURT: Itfs not 
DeYOUNG: Thatfs 
m — I wish 
I make, but 
true. 
uncontested. 
fine. 
I had the record 
— 
All right. 
COURT: Well, why haven't you returned the I 
phone calls, Mr. Ljungberg? 
MR. 
I I have met on 
LJUNGBERG: Your Honor, we --• Mr. DeYoung and 
numerous occasions. We've talked for several 
months. I have, I think, 
to tell him. 
available for 
he's talking < 
tax is. And : 
asks what the 
explained, on 
If he wants 
that, but I 
told 
help 
— I 
him everythi .ng that I have 
preparing for his trial I'm 
don't know what the hell 
about when he asks me what the 
E don't know what 
nature and cause 
he's talkinc 
\ subject of the 
f about when he 
of the accusation is. I've 
numerous occasions, what the 
against him, what I think 
to a point, I 
listen to my < 
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MR. 
charges are 
the possible defense is, and up 
have other people that I can 
advice. 
COURT: All 
LJUNGBERG: 
about 160 active cases, I 
calls unless : 
THE 
right. 
And 
— I1 
help and will 
so, given the fact I have i 
m not going 
E have something to tell him. 
COURT: Mr. Ljungberg, first 
to return phone j 
of all, I'll ask 
110 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
you to refrain from speaking as you just did in court. I 
think that's a little excessive under these circumstances, 
referring to "what the hell." You don't need to do that 
here. 
With regard to other communications, as an 
officer of the court, what is your representation regarding 
whether the — not the subject of the discussions, but over 
the course of your involvement as standby counsel for 
Mr. DeYoung, have there been discussions regarding 
Mr. DeYoung's constitutional rights, the nature of the 
charges against him, the nature of the proceedings, 
discussion regarding the evidence the State has about which 
you were aware, and how that relates to the elements and 
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MR. LJUNGBERG: Yes. 
THE COURT: — had the opportunity to do that? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: To the best of my ability, I have 
tried to explain that to him. 
THE COURT: All right. And over what period of 
time would you say — or the amount of time all together 
would you say that you had spent assisting Mr. DeYoung in 
this case? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Well, since January, we probably 
met in my office five times maybe, well, four to six times. 
For a period of time, Mr. DeYoung would stop in maybe every 
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1 other week and we would have some discussions anywhere from 
2 one hour to two hours, in addition to the time I spent in 
3 court. But I think that we have talked about the case and 
4 we've also talked about other issues not related to the 
5 case. And so a lot of that time was spent, me trying to 
6 understand Mr. DeYoung's position rather than me telling 
7 him how the criminal justice system works. 
8 I THE COURT: I see. All right. How many hours 
9 | would you estimate all together you have spent in 
10 J connection with this case? 
11 MR. LJUNGBERG: Well, 25, probably. 
12 j THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung, would you 
13 like to add anything else? 
14 MR. DeYOUNG: No, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung, with regard 
16 to your objection and the merits of your objection, as I 
17 I indicated to you, the law is that in a criminal case, you 
18 have the right to be represented by counsel. If you can 
19 I afford counsel, you may retain counsel at your own expense, 
20 anyone you choose who is authorized to appear in this court 
21 in behalf of you. You have the right to be represented by 
22 counsel if you cannot afford counsel and -- and I would 
23 appoint counsel to represent you, if you could not afford 
24 counsel, and I understand that that is your situation. 
25 Because you chose to represent yourself, then courts are — 
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1 you may have standby counsel to assist you. And you do not 
2 J have the right to a particular attorney. You do not have 
3 | the right to select attorney "A" for example, and say this 
is who I want you to appoint to represent me at no cost to 
5 I me. That is not a right that you have. 
6 J My concern here is that — first of all, one of 
7 | the concerns that you have is that Mr. Ljungberg has no 
I 
8 knowledge of the taxing statutes. I've read your pleadings 
9 J as we've gone along, Mr. DeYoung, and you have very 
10 specific views about the taxing statutes based on -- and on 
11 the constitution. I couldn't agree more that you have the 
12 I right to have the views that you have. I respect that you 
13 have the right and those views may be unique to you, for 
14 that matter, or -- but I certainly am profoundly respectful 
15 j of your right to have the views that you have. 
16 i But because you have certain views, and you know 
17 I've disagreed with you at different times since this case 
18 has started, about what the law says whether your views are 
19 correct as a matter of law, and I have disagreed with your 
20 view of the law at times, I -- and I think that is the 
21 situation that you are in insofar as someone not having 
22 knowledge of the taxing statutes. Let me rephrase that. 
23 There are certainly attorneys in this state who have 
24 knowledge about tax law. They are tax attorneys. They may 
25 or may not share your views as to what the law says about 
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tax. 
What appears to me here is that the problem is 
not a lack of knowledge of the taxing statutes but, rather, 
a disagreement about what the law says insofar as this 
criminal case is concerned. And that that has existed 
between you and the Court, and I perceive that that — 
there's been a difference in view of that between you and 
Mr. Ljungberg. I don't think that that has made 
Mr. Ljungberg incapable or incompetent to assist you. 
Mr. DeYoung, you are entitled to represent 
yourself in this case, as you have chosen to do, and you 
are entitled to argue the law as you understand it to the 
Court. And if that differs from the view of the law that 
an attorney has, then you do have the right to advance your 
position to the Court. 
With regard to the phone calls not returned, it 
appears to me that, given this basic difference of opinion 
about what your views are and what Mr. Ljungbergfs 
understanding of the law is, that the phone calls being not 
returned relate more to the fact that he doesn't believe he 
can be of assistance to you in your pursuit of your 
understanding of the law as it pertains to some issues. 
And not because he's indifferent to your case or 
incompetent in some way. 
The number of hours represented to the Court seem 
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1 to be well within reasonable bounds for a case of this 
2 type, and there doesn't seem to be any difference of 
3 opinion about — that Mr. Ljungberg has been able to answer 
4 your questions about criminal procedure as opposed to 
5 responding to questions you have about — that arise 
6 directly out of your view of the constitution. You may be 
7 seated, Mr. DeYoung. 
8 | With regard to the — for example, your complaint 
9 that he has refused to explain the nature and cause of the 
10 I accusations. I have heard your arguments about that. I 
n have not agreed with your view of the law about the 
12 specificity of the elements of the offenses with which you 
13 have been charged. And likewise, well -- I don't see that 
14 there is an incompetency here in any respect on the part of 
15 Mr. Ljungberg. 
16 I am also concerned, frankly, that this came up 
17 really relatively late in these proceedings. The objection 
18 I was first filed, as I see it, let's see, on July 25th. 
19 And this trial was continued once already, is set for trial 
20 to begin next Tuesday, and I — certainly, removing 
21 Mr. Ljungberg and having someone else stand in, that person 
22 would be unlikely to be able to get up to speed in order to 
23 be of any meaningful assistance to you. So that concerns 
24 me. 
25 But even if standby counsel were appointed, based 
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t on all of what has happened in this case, and based on this 
2 discussion, I believe that you very likely could be in 
3 exactly the same place on the eve of trial if there were 
4 another competent, able, attorney sitting next to you as 
5 standby counsel. In other words, I suspect that there may 
6 continue to be some differences of opinion about what the 
7 law is, that — that is somewhat the source of your 
8 frustration. 
9 Having said that, respectfully, your objection is 
10 overruled. I believe that I have heard nothing that makes 
11 me concerned that Mr. Ljungberg is not able to ably assist 
12 you with regard to criminal procedure, with regard to 
13 questions you might have concerning how -- what is in your 
14 best interest, questions regarding the actual conduct of 
15 the trial. Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 
16 With regard to your motions in limine, we will 
17 address those. First of all, with regard to the — there 
18 are some I actually do not need to have argument on. But I 
19 think, in the interest of time, I will go ahead and hear 
20 what you have to say. 
21 Mr. DeYoung, why don't you address each one of 
22 your motions in limine: motion in limine to exclude the 
23 1983 case regarding references to you as a "tax protester11 
24 or "taxpayer" or similar terms, and your motion in limine 
25 limiting evidence and testimony. 
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